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DIRECTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

Decentralization of Education

Teacher Management

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Foreword

This book is one in a series that covers issues in restructuring education systems. As part of education and public sector reforms, many countries are decentralizing the financing and administration of education services to regional, local, or school levels. The goal of this series is to assist policymakers to refine strategies and to choose between possible options for system restructuring.

Reforming a system is not a one-time event, but a continual process of change, assessment, and alteration according to the needs of particular times and particular countries. Good education rests in the hands of the teaching force, and system changes require changes in teacher development practices. In many cases teachers, professional organizations, unions, and government do not agree on the purpose and outcome of reform.

As a collaborative effort between Education International (as representatives of teachers worldwide) and the World Bank, the preparation of this manuscript has stimulated a thoughtful dialogue on the ways in which changes in teacher management can help improve teaching and learning. We appreciate this collaboration and look forward to further joint efforts. It is clear that the process of change will be ongoing and that there are no easy answers in seeking to achieve the goal of the Jomtien World Conference of 1990: education for all.

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1

Introduction

In almost every developing country teachers are the largest group of workers in the civil or public service and the largest item in the education budget. As the management and delivery of education comes under increasing public scrutiny, the question of how best to manage teachers is receiving much attention. For management, the goal is to have qualified and motivated teachers assigned where they are most needed, with low levels of turnover and attrition and an incentive system that encourages teachers' commitment and professionalism. For parents, the ideal is to have hardworking teachers who provide highquality education to their children. Simple though these goals may seem, they are far from being achieved in many countries.

A main issue in achieving the goals of administrators and parents is how to manage teachers to maximize their effectiveness as educators. In particular, it is important to decide at which level of administration the supervision and management of teachers should rest. In most developing countries, centralized management structures in the education sector have been the norm, usually for logical and compelling reasons. In some countries a centralized system was inherited at independence; in others it was adopted to promote a national identity and to satisfy social expectations for rapid and easy access to education. Following independence, there was often an implicit belief that central planning and state involvement were necessary to overcome inherited social and economic deficiencies. In some countries it was seen as appropriate for a centralized body such as the ministry of education to manage teachers to ensure the fair and equitable allocation of what is often a scarce resource. Thus in these countries the setting of teaching standards and the establishment of teacher training, recruitment, pay, conditions, promotion, and discipline are controlled from the center.

As education systems have expanded and lessons have been learned in both industrial and developing countries, it has become clear that centralization is not always the best approach for developing and overseeing an effective teacher-management system. Centralized structures have proven to be particularly weak in dealing with day-to-day administrative tasks such as responding to grievances and keeping records. In

addition, there has been a shift in social attitudes toward parents' rights to be involved in their children's education. Changes in public opinion about the role and ability of government and the spread of democracy and popular participation have contributed to this shift. Many communities are now demanding a greater say in how their schools are run and how teachers perform; education unions are seeking to give individual schools, teaching teams, and classroom teachers greater scope for creativity; and governments are actively looking for viable ways to devolve authority for teacher management to different levels of the system. All of these aspirations have to be balanced against the need for equity for pupils and education personnel.

In some countries attempts have already been made to decentralize many of the managerial responsibilities of the education system to various levels of local government and even to the schools themselves. In this report we explore what can be learned from international experience in decentralizing teacher management. In particular, we examine what has prompted governments to decentralize their teacher management functions, how they have done so, and which decentralization mechanisms have been most effective. We identify the factors that seem to influence success or failure, the gaps in existing knowledge, and research priorities for the future. Our aim is to assist World Bank staff and clients involved in policymaking, planning, and project management in the education sector.

The information in this report is based on a review of the literature on decentralization and teacher management. We focus on basic formal education, mainly the primary and junior secondary levels of schooling. We do not deal with preprimary or postsecondary education or with technical, vocational, or nonformal education, although we do occasionally refer to those levels. We acknowledge that the issue of decentralization (and of privatization with which decentralization is often muddled) pertains to levels of education, but those levels warrant separate analysis and are thus not included in the scope of this study.

In chapter 2 we explain the rationale for decentralizing teacher management, present three models of decentralized teacher management, explore the different functions of teacher management and how these functions are handled in centralized and decentralized systems, examine the design of decentralization reforms in various countries, and discuss the political feasibility and legal implications of decentralizing teacher management. In chapter 3 we further address key issues from the overview of experience in chapter two. Finally, in chapter 4 we draw some conclusions, make recommendations for planners and policymakers, and identify future research priorities.

Experience to date in decentralizing teacher management is limited and our knowledge of the long- or even the medium-term effectiveness of decentralization is sparse. We are, therefore, unable to say with certainty what difference all the changes described in this report will make for the quality of teaching or learning, or to recommend a single set of guidelines on the degree to which teacher management should be distributed between central and local management. Instead, we examine the options and approaches taken so far and present the available evidence. Our goal is to generate further debate and to encourage more monitoring and evaluation of existing efforts. We hope that this report will help to guide policymakers in refining strategies in ways that will improve teaching and learning in the classroom.

2

Overview of Experiences.

This chapter explores the rationale for decentralizing responsibility for managing teachers and other aspects of the education system. It presents three models of decentralized teacher management devised from the worldwide experience of decentralization. It then uses these models to explore how different functions of teacher management are handled in centralized and decentralized systems and to examine the design of decentralization reforms in several countries. Finally, it discusses the political feasibility and legal implications of decentralizing teacher management. Presentation and exploration of these models does not suggest that the diversity of experiences in the world can be reduced to ideal models. On the contrary, as the ensuing chapters will show, there is a rich range of options for teacher management.

Context for Decentralizing Teacher Management

Decentralization of teacher management does not take place in isolation. Instead, it is usually part of a process of educational decentralization motivated by one or more forces. A review of the World Bank's role in helping countries to implement decentralization found that administrative, political, financial, and pedagogical rationales have driven such reforms. A recent paper reported that the World Bank's policy favoring this reform rests on a weak analytical basis (Prud'homme 1994).

While the decentralization of education continues to attract considerable interest and support, there is an increasing demand to extract lessons from experience and to critically challenge assumptions about decentralization. Because teachers are so important to the educational process, we need information on their management under decentralized education systems.

Models of Teacher Management

In centralized models of education, teachers are usually government employees and subject to highly regulated and hierarchical management systems. These systems determine standards and qualifications and control recruitment, promotion, leave, transfers, discipline, and lines of communication. Salaries are often fixed or negotiated centrally.

We have identified three models of decentralized teacher management; these models can be found in both industrial and developing countries. We recognize that the models do not represent all of the possible approaches to decentralization, but they will serve for discussion here. In fact, a mixed model is probably the norm in most countries. The three models that we identify here are:

The administrative model, in which teacher management is decentralized to lower levels of government or to the education system itself.

The grassroots model, in which teacher management is the responsibility of community representatives.

The alternative model, which is generally used in innovative, nonmainstream programs, often in response to a shortage of qualified teachers or of resources with which to pay them. The alternative model usually exists alongside, but does not replace, the general public education system.

The Administrative Model

The administrative model of teacher management is popular in large countries with several levels of government, but it has also been applied to small countries (see box 1). The body that employs the teachers varies in this model, although most central governments opt to retain responsibility for hiring teachers, usually giving them the status of civil servants.

Thus a central ministry of education has responsibility for such normative functions as setting standards for teachers, setting salary and staffing levels for publicly paid teachers, and allocating budget resources to lower levels of administration. While teachers are usually employed by the government, a teaching service commission (or other body independent of the civil service) may approve the appointment of teachers. The legislative framework for teacher management is usually established centrally. Responsibility for negotiating with teachers organizations is also retained at the center. Teacher training often takes

Box 1. The Administrative Model in Nicaragua

Since 1993 the Ministry of Education in Nicaragua has been decentralizing the administration of primary and public secondary schools to local school-management boards. Legal responsibility for public education, including the employment of teachers, rests with the Ministry of Education, but certain functions of teacher management are being delegated to other levels of the system. The education system is organized into four administrative levels: the central, departmental, local or municipal, and school levels.

The central level controls teacher preparation, establishes staffing levels, funds teacher salaries, and sets standards for teacher qualifications and pedagogical performance. It also drafts regulations and financial controls for such programs as the Teacher Performance Incentive Scheme, which is administered at the school and municipal levels. In addition, the central level allocates budget resources to the other levels for administering different functions.

The departmental level is responsible for supervisory functions and therefore provides pedagogical support to teachers and monitors compliance with standards. It receives consolidated reports on the incentive scheme and determines the amount to be allocated to each municipality every month. The departmental level also verifies that reports are accurate and makes spot checks on schools to monitor teacher attendance. In addition, it implements in-service teacher training in cooperation with the central level.

The administrative functions delegated by the center to the local or municipal level are discharged mainly by the Municipal Education Councils established by the Ministry of Education and composed of various local representatives. The executive office of the municipal council consists of technical and administrative employees. The municipal council pays teachers' salaries (with central funds) and is responsible for approving teacher appointments, transfers, leaves of absence, and dismissals, in accordance with the relevant central laws and regulations. It also oversees the teacher incentive scheme and issues payments to eligible teachers.

Parents make voluntary contributions to primary schools. These contributions are used (supplemented by the central government where necessary) to pay incentives to teachers. Teachers are accountable for what happens in their classrooms, and their attendance is monitored by a delegate of the school council and reported to the Municipal Education Council. Teachers are expected to sign a daily attendance sheet that is maintained by the school council delegate, who ratifies the entry. The school council also informs teachers weekly of their status in relation to incentives. School heads are expected to provide internal pedagogical support to teachers.

Source: World Bank 1995c.

place in colleges controlled by the ministry of education. The regional or district offices of the ministry fulfill supervisory functions and are often responsible for appointments, transfers, promotions, leave, and discipline. They frequently also organize in-service training, provide pedagogical supervision and support to teachers, and monitor standards.

Local government (such as municipalities or district councils) or other authorities (such as churches) may be given administrative responsibility for such functions as paying salaries (usually funded from the center) and providing teachers' housing. In some cases the local governments may be responsible for advising regions and districts on promotion, discipline, and even the appointment of teachers. The school head is usually responsible for the appraisal and initial discipline of teachers.

The Grassroots Model

In the grassroots model, the approach to teachers varies depending on the values and focus of the reform. The opposite poles of this model can be quite different in motivation and in form. When parents are treated as consumers to whom the teachers are accountable, school boards are given significant power, as is the case in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom's approach represents the free market end of the spectrum. New Zealand also adopted this approach in its decentralization initiative (see box 2). When, on the other hand, the emphasis is on partnership, parents, teachers, and community leaders are more equal in terms of power and responsibility. This partnership strategy is the democratic end of the spectrum. The free-market approach tends to diminish the role of elected local bodies, such as the local education authorities in the United Kingdom. The democratic approach, while still a school-level approach, retains a role for local authorities, as in the recent decentralization initiative in Sweden (Kogan 1992).

At the school level the principal, often with a school council or committee, is responsible for the hiring, promotion, discipline, dismissal, in-service training, and appraisal of teachers. The school board is usually the teachers' official employer, even if teacher salaries are paid from public funds. Sometimes, especially in market-driven systems, the school is also responsible for setting salary levels. An intermediate layer of teacher management, such as a regional or district body, may be responsible for promotions, transfers, appeals, and pedagogical supervision and support. Few countries manage without this middle

Box 2. The Grassroots Model: School-Based Teacher Management in New Zealand

Before 1989 the education system in New Zealand was highly centralized and fragmented. Under the central Department of Education, there were regional offices, associated boards, and various councils and committees with responsibility for different aspects of teacher management. Most schools were publicly financed and had little say over teachers or other educational resources.

The reforms introduced in 1989 aimed to change this arrangement. All intermediary bodies were disbanded. Boards of trustees were established in all schools with the power to hire and fire staff. They were also given the power to allocate their operational grant. Initially, however, the boards did not control teacher salaries, which were set and paid by the central government. Existing national collective contracts for teachers also remained in place but school heads became responsible for assessing staff performance.

From 1992 to 1995 the New Zealand government conducted an experiment in so-called bulk funding in 69 of the 2,810 schools in New Zealand. The central government used a formula to determine a fixed sum per school for teacher salaries. This sum was then given to the schools, and they could decide how to use it. The scheme aimed to give schools greater flexibility in the number and range of teachers they employed. It also gave them the power to allocate some money away from teacher salaries to other inputs such as technology. The scheme was not popular with many schools or with most teachers, and although it was promoted by the government, it was resisted. School boards did not want so much responsibility for teacher management. It was decided to give schools the option of retaining centrally funded teacher salaries or moving to bulk funding. The vast majority of schools have opted to continue to have their teachers paid by the central government.

After the intermediary bodies were disbanded, several other support structures, some relevant to teacher management, were put in place. These structures include a qualifications authority, which is an independent body that works under contract to the minister of education and is responsible for setting and reviewing the standards for qualifications across the economy. There is also a teacher registration board and an education review office, which monitors schools. The New Zealand School Trustees' Association provides guidance to school boards on employment and personnel matters. The colleges of education, also under contract to the Ministry of Education, offer professional and advisory support to teachers and school managers.

Source: Sinclair 1995; Wylie 1995.

layer, although New Zealand does. In the system that uses the democratic approach, a local body may set teacher salaries (as in Sweden).

The central government is usually responsible for regulatory functions such as setting qualification standards, monitoring teaching standards, determining class size and salary levels, and establishing the legislative framework. Control over accreditation may be devolved or retained centrally. Broad national parameters on teacher salaries are often centrally negotiated with teacher unions. Sweden follows this practice even though salaries there are set locally. Preservice training may be under the ministry of education or it may be contracted out to an independent body.

The Alternative Model

The alternative or small-scale model is used mostly in local initiatives rather than in national programs. It mobilizes support from communities and nongovernmental organizations, including funding, for teachers. The support is provided directly by an NGO or through the local education authorities. Frequently, those who are employed to teach in these programs lack formal teaching qualifications. Although the programs are rarely considered permanent, some of the best ones can yield useful lessons for the formal public education system (see box 3).

In this model the school or the community is given responsibility for hiring, disciplining, and paying teachers and for supervising their attendance. Standards are usually established at the local level for teacher qualifications, pupil-teacher ratios, pay scales, incentives, conditions of employment, pedagogical supervision, and in-service training. All of these standards are set independently of the national norms. Preservice training is provided by local academic institutions, the local government (for example, municipalities), or NGOs. At the center the ministry of education may establish certain regulations, such as those governing teacher qualifications, and set minimum salary levels for teachers at alternative schools. But these standards usually do not meet the national standards and scales for qualification and salaries.

Teacher Management Functions.

Although there is considerable variation in the teacher management structures used in different countries, little data are available about

Box 3. The Alternative Model: The Basic Education Expansion Project in Mali

In the 1980s Mali's education system was centralized and suffered from severe resource constraints that affected the training and hiring of teachers and the number of schools available. In the Kolondieba district, for example, the gross primary enrollment rate in 1991/1992 was 14 percent; for girls the rate was only 8.5 percent. The Basic Education Expansion Project was set up in 1990 to expand access to primary education in Mali by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) using simple interventions to provide basic formal instruction. The project, which has been supported by USAID and Save the Children/USA, was developed in conjunction with an education project sponsored by the World Bank, USAID, and other donors.

The project aims to lower the requirements for entry into the teaching profession and to shorten the duration of teacher training to one month of initial training and two weeks of in-service training each year. Hiring is done by local villagers. Few of the new recruits to teaching have had more than six years of formal schooling and some have just had literacy training. This level of training was, however, felt to be adequate for providing a restricted curriculum centered on literacy and numeracy taught in the local language. Teachers' salaries are paid by the village from fees and contributions from the village association. The average salary in the program is US\$12.80 a month, while the average salary for state teachers is US\$110 a month. Teachers are accountable to the villagers. The attendance of teachers and students is reported to be high (for students it is more than 95 percent in 60 of the 62 schools participating in the project).

Pedagogical supervision and support is provided by Save the Children project staff, who visit weekly, and by a representative from the local education authority, whose fuel costs for travel are met by Save the Children. There is some dissatisfaction with the approach to supervision used by the

(text box continued on next page)

the effects of different structures on teacher performance. An effective teacher management system must assure teachers that they will be adequately and regularly paid, that they will enjoy conditions of service appropriate to their profession, that they will have access to continuing professional development, that they will be able to progress along a clear and objective career path, and that they will be governed by a set of regulations and procedures that are reasonable, transparent, and fairly implemented. Above all, the system must make adequate provision for training and preparing teachers for the classroom. A good system will also provide teachers with recognition and feedback on their contribution, include appropriate performance incen-

(text box continued from previous page)

program, which is basically unstructured observation and feedback. It is planned to strengthen this aspect of the program through further training, which Save the Children will provide in collaboration with the training institutes of the Ministry of Basic Education.

Since the project was established, enrollment has increased, although dropout rates are high because many primary students are older than the norm for their grade. A survey of dropouts revealed that many were adolescents, some of whom left to pursue income-generating opportunities outside the village, or in the case of girls, to get married. Academic achievements of the students in the participating schools has not been evaluated systematically. The 1995 national education policy in Mali was influenced by this project. For example, the national program advocates and promotes the local recruitment and training of teachers.

Innovative projects of the kind initiated in Mali raise certain issues. Teachers in the project may well organize collectively to bargain for better pay and status. Pressure from parents may be exerted to expand the curriculum and to hire more highly qualified teachers. Teachers in the state sector and their unions may be concerned by the threat that the project poses to the civil service status and level of pay of state teachers. While their pay level is well above what the teachers in the project receive, it is not relative to the cost of living in Mali. An added concern is that the costs of teacher training and pedagogical supervision in the project have to be met by external sources and are therefore not sustainable or widely replicable. Questions can also be raised about the fact that state support to basic education is mainly helping urban families, while rural families in the project must contribute their own funds and rely on external assistance. Most official schools, which are fully funded by the government, are in urban settings, while unofficial schools in rural settings are funded by families or by assistance from external agencies such as Save the Children.

Source: De Stefano 1995.

tives to foster and reward good teaching, take into account teachers' rights to contribute to and influence the decisions that affect them, and promote good relations and communication between teachers and other stakeholders in education, such as parents and educational management.

As we have seen, there have been reform programs in many countries, both industrial and developing, that have decentralized the responsibility for teacher management to a lower level of government, to the local community, or to the school itself. In this section we look at how various aspects of teacher management have been affected by decentralization in these countries.

Teacher Professionalism, Standards, Certification, and Preservice Training

Teachers are the key resource in any nation's educational system. In principle, decentralizing teacher management gives local stakeholders more autonomy. But the removal of a heavy central control structure often also leads to less professional support for teachers. In addition, central control may be replaced by increased accountability requirements as has happened in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Parents and local authorities may provide some supervision, but this supervision rarely extends to pedagogical issues such as expertise in teaching methods. The net result of decentralization is that the system becomes more dependent on teachers to deliver high-quality teaching in the classroom, requiring them to be even more responsible and professional.

Decentralization reforms should, therefore, include strategies to increase the ability of teachers to uphold high-quality teaching standards. One positive approach gives teachers more control over the accreditation, licensing, and advanced certification of teachers and over the setting and monitoring of ethical standards of practice. This approach is increasingly popular in both industrial (for example, Australia and the United States) and developing countries (for example, Mauritius and Ghana). Traditionally, professional accreditation has been weaker for teachers than for other established professions. Experience suggests that standards are higher and more rigorously enforced when professional associations accredit professionals. In the United States professional standards boards have recently been established in twelve states and at the national level. In Australia a teaching council was established in 1993 to develop a system of professional standards and national teacher registration (Darling-Hammond 1995). The General Teaching Council of Scotland, which is made up of fifty members of whom thirty are teachers elected by their peers, is responsible for keeping a register of approved teachers for evaluating and approving all teacher training courses, and for removing from the register teachers who bring the profession into disrepute (Halliday 1995). Under the Professional Support Program, the Association for the Development of Education in Africa, along with many countries in Africa are considering the possibility of establishing professional teacher councils or teaching service commissions (Commonwealth Secretariat/Donors to African Education 1995).

Policymakers in systems undergoing decentralization should seriously consider devolving responsibility for setting standards for entry into the profession and for upholding good practice to professional

teachers organizations. Such devolution should be possible if the administrative or the grassroots model is being used. The situation is different for the smaller innovative programs typical of the alternative model, which often use unqualified teachers. The current and future status of these unqualified teachers is a cause of concern to professional teachers and should be addressed through innovative in-service training and upgrading programs. The government can more effectively maintain its overall responsibility for regulating standards by devolving some responsibility to professional bodies.

Setting standards for entry into training programs, length of training, content of training, and exit from programs are key functions in regulating teacher training. Throughout the world teacher training is usually determined by national ministries of education, even in federal states such as Brazil and Nigeria (although not in the United States), where the states have some responsibility for teacher preparation. Responsibility for training teachers can be devolved to various bodies, such as the General Teaching Council in Scotland. Sometimes stakeholders (such as teachers unions, parents' organizations, and professional bodies) demand to have some influence over teacher education. One way to involve them in the process is to establish advisory bodies such as the National Council for Education in Zambia and the National Education Committee in Nepal. Such bodies usually do not have any authority, but they can offer ideas and make proposals. In some cases the body is permanent, but in other instances a temporary commission or task force fulfills this function. Getting the balance of influence right between the politicians and the bureaucrats on the one hand and the teachers and other stakeholders on the other is an ever-shifting process, as is determining the relative weight to be given to national, regional, and local interests. Country-specific circumstances, such as the diversity of Indonesia's culture, the enormous size of China, and the legacy of apartheid in South Africa, also come into play in devising standards and certification for teachers.

Teacher training programs are usually provided at colleges or universities. Sometimes these institutions enjoy considerable latitude in designing their teacher training programs within the definitions set down by the education ministry. In countries such as Malawi and Zimbabwe, in which the ministry of education operates the training colleges, it has considerable control over the curriculum. In other countries, such as the Philippines, the provision of teacher education is fragmented. Approximately 80 percent of all initial teacher preparation in the Philippines is provided by the private sector, mostly at poorly regulated teacher training institutes. Enrollment in these programs greatly exceeds demand for newly trained teachers. While the standards for accredita-

tion are set by the central government, the system is voluntary and only about 20 percent of the training institutes participate. Responsibility has devolved in the Philippines without any proper regulatory mechanisms to set standards. Attempts are now being made to reduce the numbers of teacher training institutes, to upgrade those that remain, and to set higher overall standards for teachers (World Bank 1995c).

Even in highly decentralized systems of education, the ministry of education usually has a role in setting standards, establishing levels of teacher qualification and certification, and providing block grants to schools. In cases where a government does not pay the teachers' salaries, it may nevertheless set standards for the minimum qualifications of those teachers, as does Kenya. Such standards are not, however, always complied with. In 1982 community schools in Kenya, called harambee schools, had much higher percentages of untrained secondary school teachers (87.3 percent) than did government schools (15.4 percent) (Lillis and Ayot 1988). In China the government sets minimum salary levels, which are sufficiently high to attract qualified teachers. This policy reduces the risk of cheaper but underqualified teachers being hired (Cheng 1990). Centralized salary standards do not, however, always work. Despite the efforts of the federal government in Colombia to prohibit states from employing unqualified teachers, the states did not comply. This problem highlights the importance of dealing with the question of teacher supply separately from the issue of the decentralization of teacher management.

In many countries the morale among teachers is low and it is difficult to attract good candidates into teacher education programs. Teachers complain that their image and status in society has fallen and that they are no longer seen as professionals. Among the reasons put forward for this decline are the fall in minimum qualification standards and the shortening of teacher training programs. Teachers fear that surcharges lower the standing of their profession and give the impression that anyone can teach. Governments usually adopt shortened teacher training programs when enrollment is dangerously low, when they cannot meet the demand for qualified teachers, and when they cannot afford to pay for fully qualified teachers. Concerns have been expressed that adopting shortened training programs will lead to the deprofessionalization of teaching (see box 4). Many NGOs are rethinking their support of such programs. Concerns have been expressed about the emergence of a twin-track approach to education, in which NGO-sponsored projects substitute for government-supported programs only to offer unqualified teachers and a lower quality of schooling, usually to the poor.

Not all countries want to involve their local communities or schools in certifying teachers or setting teacher standards. In France, for exam-

Box 4. The Innovative Teacher Training Program in Rajasthan, India

In the State of Rajasthan, India, the Shiksha Karmi program, funded by the Swedish International Development Authority, recruits local residents to teach in schools that lack professional teachers or that have teachers who do not turn up for classes. The residents receive thirty days of intensive training and two days a month of in-service training. The government pays stipends to these teachers. So far there has been some resentment from local teachers but no organized opposition. The absence of organized opposition may be because of the scarcity of teacher unemployment in the state and because the program operates in remote villages, possibly saving professional teachers from being posted to these areas. If the program were, however, to be expanded, conflicts would become more likely.

Source: Archer 1994.

ple, 70 percent of the population believes that regional governments should be given more power in the financing and management of schools, and 60 percent believes that regions should be given more power in the recruiting of teachers. Only 12 percent, however, believe that regions should have responsibility for granting teacher diplomas. (Cremer, Estache, and Seabright 1994).

In most countries it is probably unrealistic to expect much local involvement in setting standards or certifying teachers, except for alternative programs. Local involvement of this kind is probably also undesirable. Certification should be done at a higher level by a recognized body. In most countries the central government should oversee certification, although in federal systems, the state may do so. But as the examples given here have shown, there is scope for sharing responsibility among stakeholders, including teachers, for standard setting and teacher preparation.

Teacher Recruitment and Posting

Personnel issues are a sensitive area in any decentralization process. It must be decided which aspects of teacher recruitment and posting should remain the responsibility of the central government and which could be more efficiently administered at a local level. The central government should almost certainly maintain some measure of control

over the total number of teachers employed (and, therefore over expenditure levels) in the public sector. It is also appropriate for the central government to set qualification standards. But the choice of individual teachers and the decisions about the pattern of staffing in the schools may be made locally, even at the school level.

The responsibility for hiring teachers, even in systems that are partly decentralized, is often kept by the ministry of education or another central body. However, in an increasing number of countries, such as Tanzania and Nigeria, parents are becoming worried about teacher absenteeism and are demanding to be more involved in the hiring of teachers (Galabawa 1993; Gaynor 1995). In other countries, where the question of who gets hired and promoted in the decentralized system is political, teachers are lobbying for a return to centralized control over their recruitment. For example, in many states in Brazil, teachers are hired and fired at the discretion of local politicians (Plank 1993). Similarly, it is common in Colombia and Pakistan for teachers to be hired on the basis of their political loyalties (Hanson 1995).

In countries that have a shortage of teachers or many remote or disadvantaged areas where teachers are needed, difficult decisions must be made at some level about how best to deploy teachers. Forcing them to work in remote areas will probably not be effective, because teachers' needs must be taken into account to ensure that they perform well in the classroom. Teachers near to retirement age may want to serve in their home areas, and teachers who are married to other teachers will usually want to be posted with their spouse. These aspirations are legitimate and they must be reconciled with the needs of the education system. In Zambia pupil-teacher ratios in urban areas are much lower than in rural areas. Teachers who refuse a rural posting may find themselves on unpaid leave until a vacancy arises in the urban area where they wish to work. In Pakistan the Social Sector Coordinating Committee of Cabinet directed that, as far as possible, only candidates who come from a specific district should be appointed to schools in that district. The committee also directed that qualification requirements be upheld and that all appointments be made on merit.

A teacher shortage can also raise the problem of how best to distribute teachers across the country. Sri Lanka addressed the problem by creating a national policy on teacher transfers (see box 5). This approach is not uncommon, but it is not ideal because it leads to a high turnover of staff and to the appointment of young and inexperienced teachers to the most difficult postings. The approach is also difficult to administer, as the governments of Botswana and Nigeria discovered when they attempted to implement similar arrangements that obliged teachers to spend some years in unpopular rural areas.

Box 5. Decentralized Teacher Deployment in Sri Lanka

In Sri Lanka responsibility for deploying teachers rests at the provincial level, while transferring teachers is the responsibility of provinces and divisions. A division is an administrative unit, more localized than a province, and usually encompassing about 40 schools. Because no one focuses on the nationwide distribution of teachers, some provinces have more teachers than they need, while others have too few. A new national policy on teacher transfers was introduced in 1995, setting up transfer boards at three administrative levels from zonal to line ministry. Schools have been classified according to four categories based on whether or not teachers find them desirable places to work. Minimum and maximum numbers of years have been set for service at different types of schools. It is hoped that this policy will ensure that teachers are more equitably distributed and that even the most remote schools will get qualified teachers. In practice it appears that the more difficult postings are being given to newly qualified teachers. As a result, schools with such postings are getting teachers who are qualified but who have no classroom experience.

Source: World Bank 1995e.

Providing incentives is more effective than coercion, and many countries, such as the Gambia and Sierra Leone, have adopted this approach. Incentives can include hardship allowances, housing or rent subsidies, travel subsidies, special study leave, or enhanced promotional prospects. The posting of married couples together and the cessation of the practice of using rural postings as a form of discipline would increase teachers' enthusiasm for their postings. But country experience shows that incentives alone may not be enough. Botswana has found success through a combination of coercion, incentives, and improvement to facilities in rural schools. This combination has enabled the country to staff all of its primary and secondary schools despite its highly scattered population and many remote areas (Thompson 1995).

While there may be an argument for allowing parents and communities to have some say in hiring and firing teachers, the rights of teachers must be safeguarded. Teachers may resist the introduction of greater control and may ask their unions to protect themselves from this possibility, as teachers in Andhra Pradesh state in India did (Hannaway 1995). Such resistance can be overcome through dialogue and the development of safeguards to meet teachers' objections. Part of their mistrust arises from a fear that decisions will be made by local people who may not appreciate the complexities of teaching and who may be influenced by economics or individual or local bias. Some countries, such as

Jamaica and Ireland, have overcome this mistrust and have recruited primary teachers locally for decades. Both of these countries have a history of church involvement in education, and teachers have long accepted local church representatives as legitimate recruiters of teachers. Teachers must be persuaded that school boards are equally appropriate recruiters of teachers.

In countries in which the demand for schooling has exceeded the extent of public provision, parents and communities have stepped in and hired teachers. In Chad, for example, where there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers and difficulty in managing those already in the system, about 40 percent of primary school teachers in 1991/92 were employed by communities (World Bank 1993). Parents may also get involved in hiring teachers when alternative forms of education not provided by government, such as denominational schooling, are established. Studies in Ghana and Tanzania have found that parents and principals would like to have more say in decisions about teacher appointments. Principals would like to be involved in early screening and in final decisions on postings (Mankoe and Maynes 1994). When teachers are given some choice over the schools to which they are posted, they are more likely to remain in their posts. Reconciling the needs of different geographical areas while meeting, as far as possible, teacher preferences is a major challenge for any level of administration.

The OECD conducted a national sample survey of the general population in twelve countries that showed support for the involvement of local people in the hiring of teachers. School-level decision making was most strongly supported for teacher selection and promotion. There was, however, wide divergence among countries. In some countries, support for school-level selection and promotion of teachers was low, underscoring the need to avoid generalizations. Far less support was given to local level involvement in setting teachers' salaries and working conditions. In Sweden 51 percent of those surveyed favored local control of school budgets, but only 17 percent favored letting schools set teacher salaries. The respondents' stated preferences did not necessarily follow national policy. French respondents supported local teacher selection, but that is not the national policy or practice. There was similar support for local teacher selection in the United Kingdom, where it is national policy. Table 1 reports the level of support among the respondents for local involvement in selecting and promoting teachers and in determining their salaries and working conditions (CERI and OECD 1995).

In Western countries where local authorities and school boards are responsible for appointing teachers, vacancies are usually advertised in the national media. In Ireland there are established appointment procedures for recruiting primary teachers. These procedures are set out in

Table 1. Decisionmaking at the School Level, 1993/94
(percentage of respondents who thought that it was very important for decisions to be made by schools themselves)

Country	Teacher selection and promotion	Teacher salaries and working conditions
Austria	31	18
Belgium (Flemish speaking)	39	26
Denmark	31	12
Finland	34	22
France	59	43
Netherlands	47	24
Portugal	51	37
Spain	20	13
Sweden	44	17
Switzerland	26	14
United Kingdom	50	32
United States	67	57

Source: CERI and OECD 1995.

the rules and constitutions of the boards that manage schools. The teacher enters into a contract with the board of management. This direct relationship between the teacher and the school has advantages for both parties. Introducing this system of recruitment requires consultation with all stakeholders and built-in safeguards to ensure that local teacher recruitment complies with government regulations and controls.

Communities in developing countries may find it difficult to recruit qualified local teachers or to mount wide recruitment campaigns to attract candidates from other areas. In countries affected by this problem a regional or national register of qualified teachers should be maintained, and schools should have access to this register when recruiting staff. A list of vacancies for each term might also be compiled and circulated to schools and teacher training colleges.

The appointment of the school head is important for any school. Some countries have sought to give parents a stronger voice in selecting the head, and some countries have devolved the hiring of principals to local school boards. For example, in the Minas Gerais state in Brazil, principals are elected by the entire school community by secret ballot. Three candidates who have passed a battery of objective examinations compete in the selection. Eighty-five percent of primary school principals in the state are now elected, breaking the cycle of patronage that previously existed (de Mello and Neubauer da Silva 1993). Ghana has recently increased the responsibility of district directors, and directors can now appoint school heads.

Teacher Promotion, Transfer, and Dismissal

Salary is not the only determinant of teacher status or performance. Teachers are also concerned about opportunities for promotion. The career structure for teachers in basic education is pyramidal; there are usually many teachers at the base and little scope for promotion to higher levels. Promotion for teachers often means leaving classroom teaching for administration. This pattern has a negative effect on teachers' morale and downgrades the status of teaching. Some countries, such as Australia and Ireland, are increasing the number and variety of teaching posts by, for example, creating more graded posts of special responsibility. These posts supplement the traditional promotional posts of head and deputy head. The duties attached to these special posts should be central to the schools' instructional and staff development needs, rather than duties of a routine administrative nature.

The procedures for filling higher-level posts in education, both teaching and administrative, are usually set by the central government, even in countries in which other decisions are made at more local levels. In some countries, such as Botswana, every promotional post is advertised, while in other countries, such as Zambia, only headships are advertised. The criteria for promotion to more senior positions should be clear and understandable. Many teachers complain, however, that the procedures for promotion are neither transparent nor fair. Even when procedures are in place, teachers may not know about them because there is no proper vacancy announcement system. In Bangladesh, where transfers, promotions, and disciplinary measures are decided by district committees, allegations of corruption and political favor are common (IIEP/UNICEF 1994).

It is sometimes argued that seniority (length of service) should be the only criterion for promotion. In systems in which parents and students are given a say, reliance on seniority alone is unlikely to be acceptable. Getting teachers to accept that they have to prove their merit to get a promotion may require a lengthy process of dialogue and negotiation. Teachers tend to be concerned about the damage that competing for promotion can do to the spirit of cooperation in schools; they are also often concerned about the influence of local political and personal biases on appointments that are supposed to be made on merit. Adequate guarantees to meet these concerns are required to ensure that teachers accept the principle of promotion on merit. Involving teachers in setting objective promotion criteria, ensuring that they are represented on promotion panels, and providing an appeals mechanism can help to address these concerns.

It may be necessary to transfer teachers to ensure that vacancies are filled and that there is an equitable distribution of teachers across the country. Promotions usually also involve transfers, creating particular difficulties for married women teachers who are expected by society to remain with their husbands. It is uncommon in most countries for husbands to leave their jobs to follow their wives to new work locations.

If teachers disregard the standards that have been set to govern their conduct, disciplinary procedures and even dismissal may be warranted. In countries in which the central government is responsible for discipline, delays, misinterpretations, and accusations of unfairness often abound, and a tortuous process through district, regional, and central levels has to be followed before a teacher can be fired. For example, a recent review found the teacher discipline system in Ghana to be inadequate. Regions and districts in Ghana can transfer teachers but not dismiss them. Circuit supervisors of the ministry of education who are assigned twenty-five schools in an area called a circuit, send a series of warning letters to teachers in need of discipline. If the letters are ineffective, the teacher is summoned to appear before the district officer for disciplinary action. There are often delays, which undermine the disciplinary process (Asire-Bediko and others 1995).

The state education secretariat in the Minas Gerais state in Brazil allows schools to hold the personnel records of their teachers. Although salary levels are established at the state level, schools manage and control the personnel matters of their own employees. This practice has made it possible to respond faster to problems. The schools in Minas Gerais are, however, fortunate because they were given funds by the state to establish computer systems for personnel planning and control, an advantage lacking in schools in most developing countries and even in smaller schools in industrial countries (Amaral and others 1995). In addition to access to technology, adequate support, such as funding to employ support staff, should be given to schools to ensure that principals are not overburdened with administering decentralized teacher management.

In Nicaragua municipal education councils employ teachers and pay them (using funds from the central government), and have the authority to hire and fire them within a legal framework that protects their rights (see box 1). Teachers are initially apprehensive of the councils' firing powers but have come to accept that some teachers ought to be dismissed. This acceptance was gained partly because the power of dismissal was introduced as part of a wider package that improved conditions for teachers. For example, delays in the payment of teacher salaries were reduced from three months to ten days, and salaries were increased by 22 to 100 percent.

Based on the cases cited here, it is possible to extract some basic principle that apply to discipline and grievance procedures. Those people at the school or local level who are responsible for personnel must be trained to follow proper procedures. Teachers should be able to contribute to setting acceptable standards and there should be a grievance procedure that allows teachers to register complaints with another level of administration or with a special body. Decentralizing responsibility for discipline without developing the ability to carry it out effectively will inevitably lead to conflict.

In-Service Training and Professional Development

The World Bank has reported that in-service training can have a positive impact on educational quality if it is appropriate, well organized, and competently delivered (World Bank 1988). Research in Bangladesh, Colombia, and Ethiopia suggests that relevant, regular, and practical in-service training that is well implemented is a prerequisite for school excellence (Dalin 1992). A study of in-service teacher training in selected World Bank projects in Sub-Saharan Africa showed that directorates of the Ministry of Education implemented most of the training projects. Many people would argue that schools should be responsible for the ongoing training of all teachers and be given assistance to fulfill this responsibility. The task of organizing in-service training cannot, however, be given to the school level alone. It makes sense on pragmatic and equity grounds to organize such training at a regional or central level, depending on the structure of the education system and geographic conditions.

Collegial working practices within and among schools are becoming popular as a means of diminishing the isolation of teachers in their classrooms. Such practices also help to circumvent the top-down, centralized approach to in-service training. The concept of cluster schools has been introduced in Nepal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. A cluster consists of ten to fifteen schools, one of which is responsible for the pedagogic and administrative supervision of the other schools in the cluster. Teachers in the cluster receive five days of regular monthly in-service training at the core school. Sustaining this effort may be a problem. In both Nepal and Zimbabwe teacher enthusiasm has waned because of the workload involved. This problem reemphasizes the need to balance school-level training with regional and central involvement in providing in-service training.

Teacher training, both preservice and in-service, is often badly organized, with few effective links between schools and teacher training

institutes. This problem is compounded in countries such as Namibia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, where two different ministries administer teacher training and schools. In Mauritius regional education centers have been established through a master plan for education. Those centers will plan and implement training programs, workshops, and seminars for teachers and head teachers. Burkino Faso has introduced an initiative to expand and decentralize professional training for teachers (see box 6).

It is difficult for local groups to fund and organize in-service training. Most of the groups that have been able to do so have benefited from an innovative program or external support. Nongovernmental organizations can provide in-service teacher training in several countries. For example, in Uganda ACTIONAID relied on distance education to provide in-service training to underqualified primary school teachers in the Mubende district, where a 1991 survey found that 81 percent of teachers were untrained. Recognition of training by the Ministry of Education was important for participants. There are now

Box 6. In-Service Training Initiative in Burkina Faso

Burkino Faso's in-service training initiative, started in 1991, was developed as part of a nationwide reform program, Education IV, which was supported by the World Bank and other donors. The initiative arose in response to an acute shortage of fully trained primary teachers, only 20 percent of the country's primary teachers in the profession had advanced teachers' certificates. The program put special emphasis on in-service training for rural teachers. Initial and in-service training was organized and run by provincial inspectors. Teachers attended three-week seminars at the beginning and the end of the school year and received supervision and support from inspectors and school directors in the intervening time. The supervisors received training to help them carry out their duties. While the training offered through the program was administratively decentralized, it was determined and controlled by central government. In addition, training was directive in style despite encouragement from the government to make it participatory. Training alone cannot solve all problems. Under this project it has given a boost to professional morale, but primary teachers in Burkina Faso also have to contend with problems such as social isolation, lack of materials, limited professional stimulation, and poor housing. In-service training and other initiatives of Education IV do not sufficiently address fundamental structural constraints and this limits the scope for effective reform.

Source: MacClure 1994.

plans to expand the project to cover the whole northern region in Uganda. In India local NGOs and state governments have collaborated to provide teacher training through several innovative projects. For example, in the Lok Jumbish project, training programs for teachers are run by experienced NGOs and are funded by the state government. Courses focus on increasing the participatory aspect of the education process (Archer 1994).

Providing quality in-service training on a low budget can be challenging, but it is necessary to invest in the professional development of teachers. One way to involve teachers in their own professional development is to ask them to design and run in-service courses. The benefits of such courses may be comparable to those of formally designed programs because teachers have as much to learn from one another as they do from outside sources.

Teachers unions in some countries provide in-service training. In Ireland, for example, a pilot project was undertaken by the Irish National Teachers Organization (INTO) in 1994. Over a six-month period, 1,128 teachers participated in 58 in-service courses offered by the organization and funded by the Irish Department of Education and the European Social Fund. The pilot project, which has since been expanded, developed structures at the local level to ensure that local teachers were involved in devising strategies and in delivering the training programs (INTO 1995). Some teachers organizations offer in-service training in countries other than their own through cooperative development projects. Canada, France, and Switzerland, for example, provide training for teachers in developing countries. This support has also helped teachers unions in developing countries such as Ghana to organize their own in-service courses.

Bodies outside the education sector may also provide in-service teacher training. As the movement to privatize education gains momentum in countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom, the contracting out of training to private enterprise is being promoted. The experience of Hungary should, however, act as a warning against adopting this approach in markets that are not dynamic.

Many would argue against the privatization of training, even in strong markets. For example, it has been suggested that competition in New Zealand is undermining quality as private providers aggressively market quick fixes and public providers flounder because of spending cuts (Education International 1997). A growing number of private enterprises in Hungary are now offering in-service training for teachers and management training for school directors, just when uncertainty about state funding has forced many of the country's county pedagogical institutes to introduce fees and shorten courses. Many

courses are on offer but little is known about their quality. A recent article reported that a plethora of public, half-private, and fully private enterprises are marketing their services to schools. These enterprises are financed by several sources and use unregulated curriculums. In the absence of a regulatory framework, choosing among these providers can only be bewildering to schools and wasteful of scarce resources.

Salaries, Incentives, and Conditions of Service

The power to set pay rates for teachers usually belongs to the central government, and governments are understandably wary about decentralizing power. In most countries teachers organizations have a say in negotiating levels of pay, but their influence varies depending on whether there is a full collective bargaining process, some form of negotiation, or a mere consultation. The rationale for central involvement has to do with affordability and equity.

The terms and conditions of teachers' employment are important because they determine, to a large extent, the quality of candidates attracted to the profession. Most teachers seem to believe that they are poorly paid compared with other professionals. There is some objective evidence for this point of view (Lockheed and Verspoors 1991). Low salaries are blamed in many countries for forcing teachers to take second or even third jobs, which may or may not be at another school. Low salaries are also blamed for high teacher absenteeism and for the growth in the supply of preparatory courses. Parents must pay extra tuition for their children to take these courses, which are frequently taught by teachers who do not turn up to teach their regular classes. A study in Tanzania found that 77 percent of all primary teachers earn additional income from outside jobs. Teachers salaries are low in Brazil, especially in the poorer states, and they are under threat because of constant inflation. Low salaries contribute to frequent strikes (Plank 1993). In central and eastern Europe many foreign language teachers are leaving schools to work in private companies that offer much higher salaries, sometimes twice what the teachers earn at the schools.

Devolving the responsibility for determining salaries to the local or school level can cause problems. As a result of recent reforms in the United Kingdom, local education authorities give each school a cash sum based on the average cost of a teacher in the local education authority instead of giving the school a cash transfer equal to the actual salaries of the teachers on staff. This practice puts pressure on schools to appoint

staff who are cheap and thus not qualified or inexperienced. A recent study by the University of Birmingham found considerable anxiety among school heads and teachers about the practice. The two-and-a-half-year study of 812 schools reported that a trend of employing teachers on temporary contracts has developed; 30 percent of the heads interviewed said that keeping salaries low was or would be a consideration in their recruitment policy. One head explained that they were unable to afford the staff they wanted (Bullock and Thomas 1994). There is no evidence of benefits to teaching or learning from decentralization of this kind.

In New Zealand teachers, principals, and most school trustees opposed a move to have boards of trustees set salary levels and conditions of employment. Trustees regarded these tasks as the government's responsibility, and they did not want to add to their workload, particularly because they gave their services on a voluntary basis. The trustees also thought that their relations with teachers would deteriorate, that inequities would increase, and that funding cuts would result (see box 2). New Zealand is not the only country to have encountered this opposition. The survey of twelve OECD countries reported in table 1 found that only in the United States did a majority (57 percent) of the general public want teachers' salaries and conditions to be set locally. It was only after many years of resistance that the teachers union in Sweden agreed to allow teachers' salaries to be set locally. The Swedish agreement included safeguards, such as a guaranteed minimum entry-level salary.

Many local authorities and communities find it difficult to offer attractive conditions and job security for teachers. Educacion con Participacion de la Comunidad (EDUCO)/(El Salvador Community Managed Schools Program) was created in 1991 by the Salvadoran government to expand education and increase local involvement by creating associations of elected community members to administer schools. One of their responsibilities is the employment of teachers. However, the absence of adequate benefits and lack of job security have caused problems. Teachers employed by the Ministry of Education have job security and receive benefits such as medical insurance, maternity leave, and pensions. They also can join the teachers union. Teachers in the EDUCO program are paid by the Ministry of Education but employed by the community on one-year renewable contracts; they are not union members. Many teachers accepted work in the EDUCO program because there was nothing else available. They saw their work in the program as a temporary option while they waited to be assigned to a public school. As a result teacher turnover in EDUCO schools was high. Moreover, the relative security of being a civil servant means that

few of the teachers employed by the Ministry of Education are willing to give up their jobs to become EDUCO teachers (Pena 1995).

Low salaries discourage qualified people from entering the teaching profession and give those who do little incentive to improve their teaching. In most countries seniority and qualifications determine salaries and bonuses. Australia has experimented with a knowledge- and skills-based approach to teachers' pay. The country's advanced skills teacher classification, established in 1990, was designed to keep teachers in the classroom by linking pay to career development. The scheme provides three career steps above that of classroom teacher; the highest step has an income level equivalent to that of a deputy principal. Candidates are supposed to have served satisfactorily for at least nine years. In the first few years, two-thirds of teachers applied and all but 7 percent of applicants were granted this classification. It would appear that many teachers see the program as a way to boost their salary rather than as an opportunity for genuine professional development. The public questioned why teachers should be paid for achieving professional standards rather than for doing extra work.

It is reasonable to expect that linking compensation to job performance would motivate teachers and would make salary increases easier to administer. It is argued by some that teacher compensation must be linked to job performance if the education system is to retain well-qualified teachers. The empirical evidence is not, however, adequate to uphold this argument. Examples of the use of merit pay in developing countries are few. The efforts that do exist are new and it is thus not possible to extract much information from them. A locally monitored incentive scheme has been implemented in Nicaragua (see box 7) and the Nicaraguan Ministry of Education is developing guidelines that include teacher performance incentives, personnel management, and criteria for paying salary supplements to teachers funded by local contributions.

Some countries offer incentives to work in unattractive locations. Indonesia gives 50 percent salary bonuses to rural teachers; Ethiopia requires rural communities to provide their teachers with housing; and Botswana gives such nonsalary incentives as housing, instructional materials, and training opportunities. In Chile ineffective incentives at the school level are contributing to poor learning achievement in municipal schools (Espinola 1995).

The Dominican Republic, supported by the World Bank, has changed its teachers compensation system with the aim of developing a clearer career structure for teachers. Teachers' salaries go up in increments if teachers improve their classroom performance or increase their qualifications (see box 8). The design of the compensation pro-

Box 7. Teacher Performance Incentives in Nicaragua

Since 1993 the Ministry of Education in Nicaragua has been decentralizing the administration of public, primary, and secondary schools to local school-management boards or councils under the Basic Education Project. One component of the project is the introduction of performance incentives for primary teachers working in schools in decentralized municipalities to encourage them to stay in their jobs and to attend school regularly. The incentives are approximately equivalent to 25 percent of the basic teachers' salary of US\$15 per month. The incentives are paid monthly and they are adjusted each term. Payment is based on regular teacher attendance and low student dropout rates.

Penalties apply when a teacher misses days of school or is late for school by thirty minutes or more on three occasions. In better-off areas the main funding source for the incentives is parents' voluntary contributions. These local contributions free up Ministry of Education funds, allowing the Ministry to provide incentive payments and bonuses to teachers in poor schools and areas. Extremely poor municipalities receive the full amount needed for the incentives from the central government, while more affluent municipalities receive less or no money from the government and use parents' contributions to make up the difference. The central government payment is adjusted each term based on the number of teachers benefiting and the size of the local contribution. The school council administers the local contributions that are received directly by the school. The council elects a member who monitors teachers' attendance. Attendance reports are signed weekly by the chair of the school council and then sent to the municipal education council. Accounting rules and financial controls are established by the Ministry of Education and are implemented by the municipality. It is expected that this incentive scheme will apply to two-thirds of all public primary teachers by 1999, the last year of the project.

Source. World Bank 1995c.

gram facilitates local participation by asking local institutions and high-performing schools to provide instructors and training materials for teachers.

Other functions related to teachers' conditions of service that might usefully be decentralized are the granting of leave, the payment of allowances and retirement benefits, and the determination of incentives that correspond to specific local requirements. The capability of the level to which the task is being devolved to deal with the task must be taken into account as must the amount of support that can be provided to make the decentralization feasible.

Box 8. Teacher Compensation in the Dominican Republic

An in-service training program has been introduced in the Dominican Republic to assist teachers who lack formal qualifications and teach in rural and marginal urban areas. The program is designed to upgrade teachers' knowledge in core subjects such as mathematics and language. The training is composed of self-study modules, group meetings of teachers, weekend and vacation training sessions, and in-school demonstrations. Instructors are recruited from high-quality local schools and universities, and they are given technical assistance in the design of training materials.

The teacher salary schedule has been revised to provide incentives to teachers to attend training courses, to improve their job performance, and to agree to be posted to rural or outlying areas. Incentives are built into the basic salary in the following way:

	Basic	Standard	Quality	Performance	Regional
Salary =	salary	+ adjustment	+ adjustment	+ evaluation	+ adjustment
	10%	10–40%	0–29%	20–25%	

The quality adjustment element is based on teachers' qualifications, while the job performance element is based on evaluations that range from 0 for a poor performance, to 7 for an acceptable performance, to 29 for a very good performance. The basic salary is increased by 25 percent for service in rural areas and by 20 percent for service in marginal urban areas.

Source: Dominican Republic 1993.

Pedagogical Supervision and Support.

All too often the teacher supervision and appraisal system serves the needs of civil servants rather than those of teachers or schools. When appraisal is designed and controlled by the central government, as it is in many African countries, the system is even more likely to favor the interests of civil servants. In Zimbabwe the standards and controls department of the Ministry of Education requires a copy of all supervisory visit reports conducted by the districts. Officials at the department admit that no use is made of the reports and that there is no good reason for them to be submitted. Teachers often do not receive copies of these reports (Gaynor 1995). There is no clear pattern in the use of inspectorates in industrial countries. In France inspection is done by both national and local authorities. There is no inspectorate in Sweden, and inspectorates have been replaced by regional and local support functions in Norway. New Zealand has created a separate body (the

educational review office). Some Australian states use self-evaluation, and the United Kingdom has plans to privatize school inspectorates.

The large number of teachers and schools compared with the small number of supervisory personnel means that great demands are placed on those responsible for assessing teachers. Many supervisors complain about the long distances that they have to travel on poor transport and about the lack of financial assistance for travel and subsistence expenses. It makes sense, therefore, for teachers to be evaluated by people located closer to the school. Local evaluations are more likely to be carried out properly and shared with the teacher and the school management, giving them the chance to make any necessary changes. In any system, whether centralized or decentralized, the school head should supervise and provide support to teachers. Many heads, however, have teaching responsibilities in addition to their administrative workloads, leaving them with no time for supervising the classroom performance of other teachers.

Sometimes, particularly at the secondary-school level, external supervisors are not capable of offering assistance to teachers on the content of what they teach. Fellow teachers may have more to offer by way of support than external supervisors. The Australian advanced skills teacher program encourages teachers to provide pedagogical support and guidance to their colleagues while improving their own classroom teaching practices.

Pedagogical supervision is not an appropriate function to devolve to the local community. Communities in some countries are, however, attempting to become more involved in this function. In Nigeria local government education authorities use locally recruited supervisors (funded by the state government). The supervisors are retired teachers who live in the community. In a recent study teachers expressed different views about the value of this system. While some teachers found the supervisors supportive and able to give more time to discussing problems than Ministry of Education inspectors, other teachers found supervisors too old and out of date in their knowledge of teaching methods (Gaynor 1995).

To be effective, the criteria on which teachers are appraised must be objective and must reflect local and school realities and priorities. Regular informal appraisal is more helpful to schools than informal yearly appraisal. Peer evaluation, self-evaluation, appraisal interviews with supervisors, and whole school and department reviews are some of the methods being considered to make appraisal less bureaucratic and more relevant and useful to schools.

In a decentralized teacher-management system appraisal should take into account the needs of teachers, schools, localities, and the nation. Expanding or tinkering with any one aspect of current supervi-

sory services is unlikely to provide a solution to the decentralization of pedagogical support. Changes must be consistent with the governance structures, must include teachers, and must be comprehensive, simple, and possible to deliver. There should be a trial period before any new measures are adopted permanently. Decisions on what is appropriate will depend on several factors, not least the skills and professionalism of teachers. Lockheed and Verspoor (1991) suggest that an effective teacher should have thorough subject matter knowledge, a range of appropriate pedagogical skills, and motivation; that supervision and support can help teachers develop these qualities; and that local delivery of support may be more effective than central delivery. Lillis (1992) argues that there is little empirical evidence on which to judge the impact of inspection and supervision, centralized or decentralized.

The Design of Reform Programs to Decentralize Teacher Management

Teacher management is usually decentralized as part of an overall plan to decentralize the education system. Thus the goals of the entire decentralization program must be worked out before identifying changes to be made in teacher management. The key to reforming teacher management is to find a way to allow community participation to flourish without losing the underlying values of a cohesive system. The wider system must ensure nationwide equity in the distribution of teachers, build a career structure for teachers that attracts and keeps good teachers, and safeguard the rights of teachers, no matter who employs them. During the design phase of the decentralization reforms stakeholders should be identified and consulted on the reform plan. The plan needs to state the problems that the reforms are designed to solve and explain the positive effects that they are expected to have in the classroom. In practice many programs are vague about what they hope to accomplish.

A recurring theme in the literature on the decentralization of teacher management is the need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the parties involved. Decisions about how to decentralize teacher-related functions must be made in context. The size of the country, the structure of its government (federal or unitary), and its resource base will have a bearing. Another critical factor is the ability of different administrative levels to deal with decentralization. Colombia's experience illustrates the need to think through all aspects of the decentralization plan and to ensure that those who are given responsibilities have the authority and tools to meet them (see box 9).

Box 9. Confusion in the Decentralization of Teacher Management in Colombia

In 1989 the Colombian congress passed legislation that transferred responsibility for management of public school teachers from the Ministry of Education to departments and municipalities. Responsibility for determining salaries remained at the center, but the inspection and supervision of teachers was passed to departments. The Ministry of Education's funding is now frozen, so if a municipality wants to hire more teachers, it must use its own funds (Hanson 1995).

Several problems have arisen since this transfer was put into practice. For example, inequities and inefficiencies in the national distribution of teachers have been perpetuated under the new system, and neither departments nor municipalities have the incentive or authority to change the distribution of teachers. There are also problems with teacher discipline, which is mainly a departmental responsibility, making it difficult and costly for municipalities to initiate disciplinary procedures. Also, departments suffer from bottlenecks and have little incentive to impose disciplinary measures on teachers. And, although schools were nominally given a central role in managing human resources, they have not been given the funds or the full authority to manage teachers. They have no authority in the selection, appointment, or transfer of teachers, and any influence they may have in the area of discipline is due largely to the persuasive ability of the principal.

There are some potential solutions to these problems. It has been suggested that sharing funding between the department and its municipalities could help to correct the imbalance in teacher distribution across municipalities. Under this plan municipalities would purchase teachers from departments. This scheme may provide the incentive for departments to redistribute teachers among the municipalities. The desired outcome would be for teachers to move away from municipalities that have too many teachers to those that have too few. Similar adjustments may be needed between departments, but it would not be easy to put such adjustments into practice. Responsibility for disciplinary processes should rest with the level that will benefit from improved discipline. For example, less teacher absenteeism would benefit the municipal level more than the departmental level, so responsibility for overseeing teacher attendance should be transferred to municipalities. The authority given to schools and principals, especially in relation to human resource management, must be strengthened. Changing the process for selecting principals by allowing the school board to appoint principals for a fixed term, for example, is one measure that may help to achieve this goal.

Source: World Bank 1995a.

Some provision should be made to monitor the implementation of the reforms because the initial design will inevitably need to be amended. Monitoring makes it possible to discover which aspects of the reform work well in practice and which do not, enabling the designers to reinforce the successful aspects of the reform and to take remedial action to change the unsuccessful aspects. Overall, little is known about the initial, medium-term, or long-term effects of decentralized teacher management.

Even though the design of the decentralization program in one country is unlikely to be appropriate in another culture or socioeconomic context, it is possible for countries to learn from the successes and failures of others. For example, Guyana and the Dominican Republic have learned lessons from each other's approach to teacher incentives in projects supported by the World Bank. Also, Nicaragua drew on lessons learned from Mexico's experience with decentralizing teacher recruitment.

The pace at which to decentralize is an important issue but one on which there are few general lessons in the literature. In Australia and Ireland teachers were already heavily involved in curriculum changes when decentralization reforms were proposed, and they protested that they were being swamped with changes. New Zealand took a fast, comprehensive approach to decentralization, the benefits of which are more difficult to decipher. The process has been demanding in terms of personnel, funds, and communications capacity, and teachers organizations indicate that morale among primary and secondary teachers is low. As a result curriculum changes have had to be slowed considerably.

The central government will always have an important role to play in safeguarding the rights of different groups. This role requires the government to make sure that the design of the decentralization reform includes specific regulations and controls to guide local decisionmaking. Information about these regulations must be widely disseminated, and personnel at different administrative levels must be trained. Consideration should also be given to how central government can help the lower administrative levels deal with their new responsibilities, particularly when responsibility is devolved to schools and existing intermediate support structures (such as education boards and regional or district offices of the ministry of education) are abolished. Decentralization followed this pattern in New Zealand and, to a certain extent, in the United Kingdom. In New Zealand the intermediate bodies were replaced by several service providers, including the Education and Training Support Agency and the Teacher Registration Board (see box 2).

There are considerable workload implications for schools that take over responsibility for teacher management. In New Zealand school

managers and trustees have experienced an increase in their paperwork since they took over personnel matters. Schools in New Zealand are small only 38 percent of primary schools have more than 200 students and most of them have only part-time clerical support, which means that the extra work has fallen on the shoulders of school staff and trustees. Teachers complain about an increased workload of administrative duties, record keeping, and assessment tasks on top of their teaching duties. The trustees have become so involved in finance and property issues that they have little time for school site innovation (Wylie 1994). Similar tensions are emerging in the United Kingdom, where considerable control has been devolved to school boards.

Box 10. Key Issues in Decentralization Reforms for Teacher Management

Reforms should:

Be part of an overall decentralization plan for the education system.

Encompass the values of the education system as a whole.

Have clear objectives and evaluate all options.

Maximize the involvement of local stakeholders, especially teachers and school support staff and their unions.

Give an educational rationale for involving intermediate tiers of government in teacher management.

Carefully assess and address equity implications.

Ensure that the central government sets regulations and controls to guide the local implementation of reforms and safeguard individual rights and equity in the education system.

Carefully consider whether schools or the central government should pay teachers salaries.

Be simple and possible to implement.

Relate to needs in the classroom.

Adopt a long time frame but set a clear sequence of stages for implementation.

Be clear about the roles and responsibilities of each level of the system.

Include a budgetary plan.

Adopt a consultative approach to planning, design, and implementation.

Include a provision for monitoring the implementation of the reforms and for adjusting them if necessary.

Include a provision for training and create structures through which the central government can support the lower administrative levels in dealing with their new responsibilities.

Source: Developed by author.


Serving on these boards demands expertise in fund-raising and financial and personnel management, and schools are finding it hard to attract school governors willing to assume these tasks. As a result, the burden of responsibility on school heads is increasing (Smyth 1994). Wylie (1995) in Carter and O'Neill reported that just under half of the trustees in New Zealand were spending an average of two to five hours a week on their work for the school; 23 percent were spending more. Principal and teacher workloads have also increased.

Reform plans must include budgets for decentralizing teacher management. According to the World Bank, The purpose of increasing school autonomy is to permit flexibility in the combination of inputs and hence improve quality and not to save resources (World Bank 1995e). Introducing teacher incentives, increasing in-service training, raising salaries, and increasing personnel all have financial implications, as do the consultative and information dissemination processes. It is necessary to know how much these changes will cost in order to assess whether decentralizing is feasible within the budget. If it is not, it is necessary to think about how these costs can be met, both in the short and long term. Box 10 summarizes some of the crucial questions that need to be addressed in the decentralization of teacher management. The following list, which is not exhaustive, is derived more from the mistakes that have been made in decentralization attempts than from successes.

The Political Feasibility of Decentralizing Teacher Management

Decentralization is a highly political issue and the extent of political will and support for it strongly influences the effectiveness of the reform. Figure 1 lists the groups with a direct interest in teacher management and describes their main needs from the teacher management system. These needs are, of course, generalized and differ among particular countries and contexts. The diagram does not include stakeholders such as the civil service or national trade unions. There is a strong argument for involving all parties in developing and implementing a decentralized teacher management system. It is logical to expect that reforms that meet the needs of these stakeholders will have a greater chance of working.

The way in which stakeholders view the reform and the state of relations among them will affect the outcome of the reform. While it is often assumed that teachers organizations will be motivated only by



Source: Developed by author.

Figure 1.
Teacher Management: The Needs of Different Stakeholders

narrow self-interest, most teachers and their organizations are deeply concerned about the overall quality of education. It is therefore important to persuade them that the proposed reform will increase the availability of education. Healthy skepticism is warranted. Politicians and government officials may act in their own narrow self-interest and may be reluctant to give up control of access to teaching posts.

Teachers unions and associations are usually strongly opposed to the devolving control over the hiring and firing of teachers to any local level of government or to schools. Teachers organizations in Australia, Colombia, Mexico, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and Australia have all fought against such a devolution. There is considerable evidence to support the teachers' caution about decentralizing teacher management. Data from different regions of the world suggest that decentralized education has often resulted in delayed payment or nonpayment of teacher salaries and in abuses of power by local officials. Brazil, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe have been troubled by such problems, which frequently lead to teacher strikes and school disruptions.

Education was centralized in Colombia in the 1970s to solve such problems. The central government enacted a national salary scale for teachers and transparent procedures for their appointment and promotion. The teachers union resisted subsequent attempts to decentralize and initiated strikes when decentralization legislation was introduced in 1992. As a result of the strikes, the Ministry of Education compromised and municipalities received less autonomy over teacher recruitment than was originally planned when reform legislation was enacted in 1993. Box 11 discusses the agendas of the main sectors in Colombia's educational reform of the early 1990s.

In Nigeria and Zimbabwe control of primary education was taken from local governments in the early 1990s and given back to the central government. Teachers were dissatisfied with local government control of the system because of delays in the payment of teacher salaries and the inability of local government to deal with educational matters. This dissatisfaction was a major factor in bringing about change. In Nigeria teacher absenteeism and strikes were common; it is estimated that many public primary schools were open for only 25 percent of the 1992/93 school year. Having succeeded in removing the responsibility for teacher management from local government control, Nigerian teachers continue to voice their opposition to local government control of teacher management by printing occasional reminders (or veiled warnings) in national and state newspapers (Gaynor 1995).

The Mexican government, after several years of trying, succeeded in gaining the agreement of the national teachers union to permit the transfer of educational authority, including authority over teacher

Box 11. The Agendas of the Teachers Union and Other Stakeholders in Influencing Educational Reform in Colombia 1992⁹⁴

A draft plan for educational reform in Colombia was prepared in 1992 by the National Planning Department in consultation with the Ministry of Finance. The role of the Ministry of Education was restricted to liaising between these two bodies; the education ministry was judged incapable of carrying through the reform, partly because ministers of education in Colombia average less than one year in the job. The teachers union was consulted on the government's draft plan. The union objected to school autonomy, private sector participation, and other elements of the decentralization bill and produced a draft plan of its own that recommended an increase in education resources; reversal of the decentralization laws of the late 1980s effectively limited school and municipal autonomy; and resolution of several issues dealing with teachers' wages and pensions.

Compared with the teachers union, which was united and coherent, the government was fragmented, and it was forced to be conciliatory when the union brought its members out on strike. The union managed to get the government to make several concessions during the legislative process. Congress could have intervened to resolve the impasse but it did not do so, not wishing to move ahead without a prior accord between the government and the union, despite the fact that many congressional leaders had a vested interest in maintaining central control over education. There were parent or community groups actively involved in the discussions. Newly elected mayors did not play an active role and municipal capacity for concerted action was weak owing to a very wide spread of ideological and political views. Private school associations did intervene to oppose the union's proposal to extend public school teachers' labor conditions to those working in private schools.

But in the end the teachers union was the only effective interlocutor of the government during congressional discussion on decentralization. Other stakeholders, even potential beneficiaries, remained passive, and the preoccupied government failed to market and sell its plan to them. In the reform finally approved, there was a timetable and plan for decentralization; reduced and delayed autonomy for municipalities and schools, some instruments to improve educational quality, including a limited form of teacher evaluation; vouchers for poor students; a provision for the contracting out of educational services; and resolution of several issues dealing with teachers' wages and pensions.

Source: Montenegro 1995.

management, from the central government to the states. Earlier attempts to push this transfer through without the support of the teachers failed. These experiences illustrate the length of time that it can take to initiate plans to decentralize teacher management.

Parents may fear that proposals to give them greater responsibility for educational matters are simply cynical efforts on the part of the government to shift responsibility for unpopular or difficult decisions onto communities and parents, while retaining real power over such matters at the center. The market wolf in democratic sheep's clothing is how Phillip Capper, a New Zealand commentator, has described those who engage in such efforts (Capper 1994). Similar fears have been expressed in Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Alleviating these fears will require the government to explain its motivation for proposing the change and to create opportunities for all affected parties to debate the issue. If the government does have a hidden agenda it will become clear as consultations proceed, making it less likely that government reforms will be accepted.

The feasibility of decentralizing teacher management also depends on its perceived impact on teaching and learning. An expectation that decentralization will improve teaching will probably influence teachers and other stakeholders to accept decentralization. Having educational goals and keeping them at the forefront of reform should help to win support from different groups.

The Legal Implications of Decentralizing Teacher Management

Devolving responsibility for teacher management from the central government requires changing laws, regulations, and accepted norms. This kind of change is not a simple technical endeavor. In education systems in which all or most teachers are civil or public servants, the legislative changes will probably be extensive. Existing education acts must be replaced or amended, and information and guidance must be given to those affected. Significant changes to the legal framework will be required to decentralize certain functions, especially those having to do with the status and responsibilities of the legal employer of teachers. While the decentralization program in New Zealand was going through the legislature between 1989 and 1994, eleven acts or amendments to acts affecting staffing were introduced, all or most of seven previously existing acts were repealed, and twelve regulations or amendments to regulations were enacted.

When decentralization involves more than one ministry, for example, the ministries of education and of local government, there can be inter-ministerial tensions unless the legislation is clear on each minister's role. For example, in Zimbabwe the Ministry of Education was unhappy with the use being made of its school per capita grants by the local government bodies (rural district councils) that managed the majority of primary schools. The Ministry of Education stopped making payments to the rural district councils, but this move was challenged successfully in court by the Ministry of Local Government, Rural, and Urban Affairs, whose position was ratified in the Local Government Act of 1988. The Ministry of Education then introduced an amendment to the Education Act setting up school development committees so that it could bypass local government and make the per capita grants directly to these school-based committees. The anomaly between the two acts still exists, and the political will to resolve this impasse seems to be lacking. Meanwhile, many schools are suffering as rural district councils abandon administration of education in their jurisdictions without any agreed upon alternative (Gaynor 1995).

Becoming the employer of teachers can be daunting for local governments or schools, but a good regulatory framework can ease their burden. In Mauritius legislation is being considered to set up a teachers' council and to devise a code of ethics; legislation has already been enacted setting up a disciplinary board before which teachers are entitled to have a hearing before any disciplinary action is taken against them. These bodies will give local administrators a legitimate framework within which to exercise their authority over teachers. Although schools in the United Kingdom are encouraged to be stand-alone units, it is the local education authority that is accountable to the courts in the event of a staff dispute.

It is important to clearly define the roles of each level of authority in the legal framework. There must be no inconsistencies and proper provisions for negotiation and collective bargaining must be made. Evidence from Australia and New Zealand suggests that the status of the employer is one of the most important items to get right. In Australia an attempt to make teachers the employees of individual schools rather than of states is being resisted, and in New Zealand plans to introduce the same changes were dropped.

Legal changes should be made only after adequate consultation with all stakeholders. The implications of the proposed legislative changes should be understood by all those who will be affected by them. Circulars explaining the changes and their likely effects should be distributed to schools and parents, and all school boards should be fully aware of their legal responsibilities and liabilities.

3

Critical Issues

This chapter continues to explore the international experience in decentralizing teacher management by discussing in greater detail some of the main issues from chapter 2.

Relations between Government and Education Unions

Gaining the support of organizations that represent numbers of teachers is essential if decentralization reforms are to become law and then to be implemented effectively at the school level. Governments' attitudes toward teachers organizations vary. Some governments are openly hostile to them, while others willingly accept their collective negotiating role. The advent of decentralization can put a strain on what is already a delicate relationship. In Chile the government was hostile to teachers and their unions in the 1980s during the decentralization of educational responsibilities to municipalities.

Teachers unions, like labor organizations in general, have changed considerably over the past fifteen years. There are now many organizations that represent teachers' interests worldwide, and teachers organizations around the globe are reconsidering their images, aims, and strategies. Some organizations include the term union in their titles, while others do not. There is a trend away from calling such organizations teachers associations or unions and toward calling them education associations or unions. Some of these organizations see themselves principally as trade unions, others see themselves as professional associations, and yet others see themselves as both. Some are affiliated with a particular political party. Many are constrained in their operations by government legislation (for example, in the United Kingdom legislation has been passed that limits the power of the trade union movement). These variations account, at least in part, for the different approaches of teachers organizations to serving their memberships. In many countries in central Europe, such as Hungary, teacher representation has evolved. Under communist party control there was a single

trade union that acted as a channel of information. Now there are many teachers organizations involved in union and professional activities, including policy negotiations with the central government.

Teachers Organizations, Teacher Statutes, and Wage Bargaining.

Successful long-term decentralization depends on teacher professionalism. In developing this professionalism, it is important to work closely with teachers unions and with other professional teacher bodies. Thus it is important to broaden the remit of teacher unions and to work closely with other professional teacher bodies. Relations between governments and teachers organizations are sometimes confrontational and unhelpful to the education system as a whole. Prawda (1990) found that many educational policies and strategies in Latin America were designed specifically to placate teachers unions or other powerful stakeholders. He also reported that ministry of education officials spend more time on teacher and union-related matters than on direct action to enhance the quality of education. Many Latin American countries have teacher statutes. These statutes can safeguard teachers' conditions of service, but they can also be overly restrictive if the union is powerful.

For example, the teacher statute in Colombia sets out procedures on teacher management, including disciplinary procedures. There is a teacher council at the department level, which has teacher representatives and representatives from department-level government. In theory teachers can be transferred within or between municipalities, but in practice teacher agreement is needed. Teachers approaching retirement sell their positions to other teachers. Governors and mayors can do little because FEDCODE, the teachers union, supports teachers in this practice. One factor in the strength of the union is that it communicates with teachers while the Ministry of Education rarely does. Gaynor (1995) reports that teachers in Nigeria also have more regular contact with, and receive more information from, their union than from education officials.

Maximizing wages and job security remains a central goal for most unions. They are now having to grapple with the issue of how to become more involved in education reform while continuing to fulfill their traditional role. Education International was established in January 1993 as a result of a merger between two international teachers unions. It has a membership of 258 national teachers unions from 140

countries. These unions represent 23 million teachers and education workers worldwide. Education International's members, who are required to be self-governing and not under the control of any political party, government, ideological, or religious grouping, are actively engaged in promoting the overall professional and trade union interests of their members. Government and education union representatives from several organizations for OECD countries met in Canberra, Australia, in June, 1994, and proposed four principles for increased union-government partnership in addressing the challenges facing education and society. The principles proposed were respectful independence that recognizes the legitimate role of both parties, continuous renewal and change in the process of self improvement, convergence of professional and industrial issues, and a conceptual shift in unionism away from an exclusive focus on industrial concerns. Acceptance of these principals is essential if teaching is to be organized around improving educational quality (Kerchner 1994).

In 1996 member states of the International Labour Organization and the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization adopted a key normative instrument *The Recommendation on the Status of Teachers*, which upholds the right of teachers to participate in educational policymaking and planning. It also upheld their right to freedom of association and acknowledges the importance of remuneration in determining the status of teachers in society (ILO/UNESCO 1966). Teachers unions and associations generally favor collective bargaining and prefer to negotiate with a central employer, usually the education ministry, rather than with local bodies. The numerical strength of teachers at the national level gives them a stronger basis from which to bargain. Teachers fear that if bargaining is localized, their negotiating power will be weakened and they will be more vulnerable to local power structures and bias. Not all teachers organizations think this way however. In British Columbia, Canada, for example, where bargaining has been devolved to the school district, the union opposes any recentralization to the provincial level. But in New Zealand unions fought successfully to maintain central control over teachers pay, arguing that devolution would exacerbate existing inequalities. Union members believe that the government agenda in decentralizing was to reduce or maintain inadequate levels of school funding and to cut pay and conditions for teachers. Unions did, however, accept the devolution of budgetary control to local school boards.

The attitude of the public toward teachers unions usually reflects the prevailing attitude toward industrial relations, which changes over time. Modifications in industrial practices, such as wage-fixing rules that teachers accepted as part of decentralization in Australia and New

Zealand, were facilitated by the changing industrial climate in both countries at the time (the late 1980s and early 1990s). The support of the trade union movement, which persuaded the teachers unions to accept changes in teacher governance, also helped (see box 12).

In some countries teachers may suspect that the government's plan to decentralize is a ploy to weaken the power of the unions. In El Salvador, where relations between the Ministry of Education and teachers were hostile, teachers feared and distrusted the state. Teacher salaries were low in El Salvador, compared with those of workers in the business sector, and their conditions and benefits were inadequate. It is difficult under such circumstances to get teachers to support reform. Unless the working and living conditions of teachers are improved in the short term, 'no reform, no matter how worthwhile, is likely to succeed where it matters most in the classroom.

Even if the central government wants to decentralize teacher management, schools and local authorities may not want to take on responsibility for negotiating with the teacher unions. In New Zealand school trustees made it clear that they wished to limit the extent of the responsibilities being devolved to them in the reform package. Four-fifths of the 700 school boards that responded to a survey in 1992 indicated that they did not want to move to a system of school-based contracts. They preferred to retain the existing system under which national collective contracts for teachers were negotiated by the unions with the National State Services Commission (Carter and O'Neill 1995).

There are advantages and disadvantages to centralized wage bargaining. One of the main fears is that it will lead to significant disparities in teachers salaries (see subsection on equity issues in this chapter). Teachers in Poland and the Russian federation now have to negotiate salaries with the local authorities; this practice may have implications for equity. In Sweden the teachers union resisted decentralized wage bargaining for some time but accepted it within a framework that established a minimum starting salary and parameters for salary progression. For local government authorities decentralization that does not come with the power to negotiate salaries can be a double-edged sword. In Colombia the Ministry of Education has retained the power to negotiate nationally uniform teachers salaries at the central level; the amount of authority that has gone to departments and municipalities is unclear. The role that teachers unions played in the devolution of power from the center to the school level in Australia is described in box 12.

There is no magic formula for how governments should work with teachers unions. But, based on experience, it seems that the best way to proceed is to follow the principles in box 13. How best to implement

Box 12. The Role of Teachers Unions in Decentralization in Australia, 1970s-1990s

The Australian Commonwealth Government first attempted to encourage decentralization of educational responsibilities in 1973. That attempt did not meet with great success, nor did the government's second attempt in the 1980s. Further attempts were initiated by state governments. These attempts were more successful and by the 1990s even the most centralized educational bureaucracy, Queensland, was putting decentralization into practice.

The reform plan put forth in the 1980s was based on a study by external experts, the full report of which was not made public. There was little effort made to prepare stakeholders, including the teachers unions, for the implications of this better schools report. The recommendations could have been more clearly articulated and positively presented to teachers. Because they were not, teachers were confused about the point of the exercise. They feared that national standards for working conditions and salaries would be eroded and that their workloads would increase. Teachers were simply not convinced of the need for a radical overhaul of the system, and for the first time in fifty years, teachers in western Australia went on strike. The union strongly objected to the devolution of teacher selection to the local level. The government withdrew its proposal for such devolution in the face of opposition, and decentralization was left in an unfinished state. While some functions were devolved, different states had different approaches, and teachers believed that the only real change that devolution had delivered was an increase in their workloads.

A third attempt was made in the 1990s as part of an industrial restructuring program called Australia Reconstructed. By this time the circumstances governing teachers' conditions had changed. For example, teachers' pay increases had to be set in accordance with wage-fixing rules set by federal and state governments, and the Australian Council of Trade Unions had to agree to them. Any negotiations between the unions and the government focused on extra pay for extra effort. The National Project on the Quality of Teaching and Learning (NPQTL), initiated in the early 1990s, had put a new emphasis on helping schools to restructure the organization of their teaching and learning. As a result of NPQTL, a number of innovative projects were proposed and implemented in schools, on the approval of union officials and the relevant education department. Every union, state employer, and representative from the private school sector that participated in NPQTL stayed on for the three-year life of the project (1991-1993). Distrust continues to linger, however, between unions and state governments.

Source: Angus 1995.

Box 13. Principles for Involving Teachers Unions in the Decentralization of Teacher Management

The following principles are based on what has been learned so far from government efforts to decentralize teacher management. Governments should:

Define a clear and acceptable pedagogical basis for reform and involve teachers in defining that basis.

Treat teachers organizations as partners in education with the right to influence the shape of reforms. Many teachers organizations react angrily because they are not involved in or even informed about the design phase reforms. Sweden has legislation that entitles teachers organizations to receive information on impending decisions.

Avoid swamping teachers. In Australia and Ireland teachers were overwhelmed when curricular and structural changes were introduced at the same time.

Provide safeguards, such as regulations, to meet teachers' concerns and consider alternative proposals that do not dilute the core principles of reform. Teacher concerns about local control in the EDUCO program in EI Salvador were relieved by taking teacher representatives to see the same system in operation in Minas Gerais, Brazil.

Provide incentives for teachers. They need not necessarily be monetary; they could be better working conditions, more promotional prospects, or greater recognition for work done.

Be transparent and open in developing reform strategies. Involve and get the support of other major stakeholders and of the public through open meetings and the media.

Source: Authors' compilation.

these principles depends on country-specific social, economic, and political circumstances.

Job Performance

Some education systems are beginning to emphasize two new principles: accountability to consumers and reward based on merit. Most teachers are certified and remunerated according to their training and experience rather than their performance. Performance relates to what teachers do in the classroom and how that affects student learning. Rewarding teacher performance is difficult because the characteristics of strong performance have not been well defined. Evidence and debate

on the pros and cons of merit pay is by no means conclusive. Furthermore, there are many problems associated with implementing merit pay in the education sector. Some educators argue that moving to a system that evaluates teachers on merit will have an adverse effect on teacher collegiality and on the spirit of cooperation in schools. But education cannot remain divorced from its surroundings. To avoid losing good teachers to other sectors, rewards for job performance must be built in. Merit pay should not, however, be implemented when resources are constrained because doing so could lead to cynicism and reduced morale. Any system of incentives should be developed carefully. The system should address teachers' fears of being assessed by nonprofessionals and contain safeguards to make the system as free as possible from bias.

Problems with Pedagogical Supervision

While many centralized education systems have trained supervisors, logistics and a lack of resources often make it impossible to provide adequate pedagogical support to all teachers, especially to those in remote areas. What teachers need from supervisors is advice and interaction that can help them develop into more confident teachers. What they receive, however, is often bureaucratic, judgmental, and motivated by a desire to control what they do. Simply devolving the supervision responsibility to the local or school level is not an adequate solution to this problem, because it cannot be assumed that school heads have the requisite skills. Thus resources need to be allocated to reorient the approach of supervisors and to train school heads to provide systematic and adequate pedagogical support to teachers. Training in alternative approaches to supervision and support cannot be expected to make up for all shortcomings. It may not, for example be possible to solve supervision problems linked to time and resource constraints by training; a more system-level response may be called for.

Changing Parent-Teacher Relations

Educational decentralization usually implies a shift in the way in which teachers and parents relate to each other. Many countries are still struggling to cope with the new role of parents as active stakeholders in education. Parent-teacher relations are most profoundly affected in

decentralization programs that have a strong market focus. In Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, parents are now seen as consumers, and teachers are held accountable to them as providers of education. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, where the decentralization programs are not as market focused, the need for teachers to be accountable to the community and to parents requires a new relationship.

Many parents in many countries would like to be more involved in selecting and monitoring teachers. Parental involvement has been achieved in experimental projects, such as in Minas Gerais, Brazil, and the EDUCO project in El Salvador. Parents in the project monitor teachers' attendance and their attention to duty. The parents report that teachers are more responsible since becoming accountable to *collegians* and community education associations made up of elected community members who have budgetary and administrative responsibilities. The teachers, however, feel threatened by parental involvement, believing that it will diminish public regard for their professional status.

Not all parents want to become involved in teacher management. The skills that parents have and the amounts of time that they can spare will influence how they feel about becoming involved. Most of the parents in the EDUCO program are illiterate. Many believe that they lack the ability to participate in educational decision making or argue that they are too preoccupied with their daily struggles to attend to school matters (Pena 1995). A 1995 social assessment of the program in Minas Gerais found that many teachers believe that parents are manipulated by school heads. The teachers feel threatened by close supervision and loss of authority.

Teachers in industrial countries have also expressed fears about increasing the involvement of parents in teacher management. Some teachers see parents as a problem and believe that their own work must compensate for the shortcomings of parents. In the United Kingdom a research study that looked at the impact of the 1988 Education Reform Act on parents found that parents had a high opinion of teachers and are keen to trust and work with them. The study concluded that teachers need to be more open to constructive criticism, more open about what they are doing, and more confident in their profession. It also concluded, however, that teachers are beginning to see parents as consumers with a legitimate role to play and that some teachers are even beginning to view parents as potential allies (Wikeley and Hughes 1995). Teachers are often defensive and sometimes try to establish a professional wall around themselves and the profession. A study under way in New Zealand is identifying different ways in which teachers undermine parental participation. Some teachers use jargon, while

others try to dominate meetings or call meetings for times that suit teachers but not parents. Some parents may react to these processes by withdrawing, and teachers then claim parental apathy (Capper 1994). Building good relations between teachers and parents is important. The Danish Education Act states that schooling is a joint responsibility of parents and teachers, and this partnership is institutionalized throughout the act.

Lack of communication clearly fosters mistrust between parents and teachers. School heads are important in brokering good parent-teacher relations. The role of the head is difficult. The head must support and uphold teachers' professional status and, at the same time, encourage parents to have a greater say in school-level decisionmaking. Developing optimal parent-teacher relations means working with teachers who are usually not well prepared to deal with parents. In-service training and professional development courses that focus on ways to exchange information with parents can help to foster a positive approach to school accountability. The international teachers organization, Education International, is considering whether to open a dialogue with its member organizations about initiating consultations with national parent organizations. Such a dialogue could prove to be a positive global initiative.

Equity Issues

One consistent finding in the literature is that decentralization appears to require a continuing role for the center (or region) in overseeing and targeting measures to disadvantaged areas and groups. Prawda (1993) reported that the gap in quality between better-off and poor schools widened during the decentralization process in four Latin American countries. According to Wylie (1995), differences between schools in New Zealand also grew during decentralization. Schools in middleclass areas of the country can attract suitable teachers more easily than schools in low-income areas with high Maori enrollment. The middleclass schools thus have fewer costs and difficulties than schools in low-income areas. Furthermore, the more affluent schools are able to spend more than schools in low-income areas on staff development and additional part-time teaching staff. The switch to school-based management does not seem adequate by itself to overcome these differentials.

Fiscal decentralization will almost certainly have implications for equity. It can, for example, exacerbate regional inequities; teachers with similar qualifications may receive vastly different salaries in different

parts of the country. The poorest areas that pay least will find it hard to attract qualified and experienced teachers and may have to settle for less. There are serious regional inequities among teachers in Brazil and Nigeria. In the highly decentralized education system in the United States, reliance on local taxes, with little compensatory financing from the center, has produced a highly differentiated per capita expenditure on education. In Kenya, the devolution of authority for financing teacher salaries and other expenditures produced tremendous disparities among community schools. Some countries have tried to address regional or geographic inequities among teachers. Bray (1994) reported that Bhutan announced in 1992 that only the best trained national teachers would be sent to community schools. While this policy indicates commitment, it will be difficult to implement. Bhutan also insists that district education officers and inspectors of the Ministry of Education make regular visits to community-based teachers and provide frequent in-service workshops for them (Bray 1994).

Regional disparities can be exacerbated by ethnic or caste differences. Throughout Mexico, about 30 percent of primary teachers had the required qualifications in 1995, this percentage fell to less than 10 when indigenous education was considered (World Bank 1995f). In Malawi a decree in the 1980s requiring all teachers to return to their regions of origin to work caused major disruption to teachers and to the education system as a whole.

Espinola (1995) found that higher-income groups in Chile favored private schools while poorer families mainly used municipal schools. On average, the municipal system spent 93 percent of its budget on teacher salaries in 1990, while the private system spent 67 percent. The difference can be attributed in part to the private schools' practice of hiring less-experienced teachers and paying low salaries. Low salaries gave rise to the taxi teachers syndrome in which teachers were forced to work in two or more schools or to seek nonteaching jobs to make a living wage. Chile's phase of decentralization in the 1990s included the objective of reducing the gap between rich and poor schools. The central level played a stronger role in directing and monitoring the education system to achieve this goal. Strategies included introducing targeting mechanisms and producing more resources and supporting schools in poor areas, both urban and rural (see box 14).

In most countries the legal framework for teacher management gives the same formal rights to men and women. These laws and regulations do not, however, ensure equity in practice, because they usually do not take into account the different roles of men and women teachers. In countries in which the need for gender equality is formally accepted, the focus tends to be on increasing female numbers rather than on

Box 14. Positive Discrimination Strategy in Chile

Begun in 1990, Chile's 900 Schools Program targeted the poorest 10 percent of primary schools, 969 in all. The schools were identified through the national assessment system. Extra assistance for slow learners was provided by trained monitors (youngsters) from the community. There were in-service workshops for teachers, emphasizing basic subject matter content. Provision of workshops and teaching facilities and improvements to school upkeep were other features of the program. Once scores go up, schools become ineligible for the program and new schools are incorporated. It is not clear what will happen to schools once the extra support is withdrawn. There is a risk that improved outcomes may not be sustained.

Source: Reimers 1993.

adjusting structures and procedures. The capacity to recognize and address gender constraints is limited, even at the central level. It is therefore vital to strengthen local ability to eliminate gender bias if teacher management is decentralized.

In Sweden teachers union recently agreed to allow teachers' salaries to be set locally. Some are concerned that local determination of salaries will result in lower pay for women than for men. This trend has been observed in other sectors that have recently been decentralized. Women are often given responsibilities that are valued less than those tasks allocated to men. The union is training the officers of its local branches to monitor and counteract this syndrome. Fears have also been expressed in the United Kingdom and in Victoria State in Australia that schools that have full control over their resources will employ temporary and part-time teachers, who cost less than full-time, permanent teachers. Since women are heavily represented among temporary and part-time teachers, women will suffer economically and personally from this practice. There is a temptation for communities and schools to hire cheaper teachers. A study in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal found that communities, because of financial constraints, are calling more often on unqualified teachers and that women are disproportionately represented in this group. These teachers do not receive the benefits of employment, such as paid holidays and sick leave, that public service employees receive. Part-time or temporary teachers also do not qualify for maternity leave, which means that pregnant teachers must work until the birth and go back to work immediately thereafter so as not to lose income (Perez 1994).

Gender bias is evident in the decentralized system of teacher appointments and postings in Nigeria, according to a report on teacher management. The report announced that the number of reported cases of sexual harassment is increasing in Nigeria, despite victims' reluctance to make and pursue formal complaints. The report calls on the central government to draft regulations specifying stiff punishments for sexual harassment (Nigeria, Ministry of Education 1994). There is no clear evidence showing that harassment is more or less of a problem under local control. What is needed in all systems, whether decentralized or not, are clear procedures and support mechanisms to ensure that victims are not isolated. These mechanisms should not be left to local authorities to initiate.

Promotion and transfer practices must take gender constraints into account to be truly equitable. In many countries women teachers may not get experience in the kinds of tasks that are favored in the competition for promotion. In addition to teaching, women are often expected to perform caretaking duties, such as tidying classrooms or attending to children who fall ill, while men are more commonly given administrative and management responsibilities. Such caretaking activities and experience are rarely valued for promotion. School heads should be trained to consider women teachers for the kinds of responsibilities that will qualify them for promotions and women teachers should be trained to attempt such tasks. Such training is best provided at the district or local level so that women can benefit from the support and experience of women from other schools in their locality.

In New Zealand the proportion of women in senior positions has not changed since teacher management was decentralized, but recent statistical data from the New Zealand Ministry of Education indicate an increase in the disadvantages faced by women seeking principal posts. It was found that applicants who were known to board members were most likely to be appointed and promoted. This trend raises the question of board membership. Female representation in local government and on school boards is limited in many countries. A recent study in Nigeria and Zimbabwe found that there were few women on the district education committees (the most local education authority) in the regions studied in Nigeria; there were also few women on the school development committees in Zimbabwe (Gaynor 1995). This absence of local female representation may make it difficult for women teachers to combat gender inequalities in a decentralized teacher management system.

The teachers union in Sweden is training local communities and authorities to recognize and eliminate gender inequalities wherever possible. This practice should be replicated in other countries, and

strategies should be devised for dealing with gender-related issues in decentralized teacher management.

Financing Issues

Important questions in financing are whether decentralized teacher management is more or less expensive than centralized management, whether decentralized management is more cost-effective, and whether it can succeed in mobilizing resources beyond what the central government can provide. Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess the relative costs of different forms of teacher management, and the literature on decentralization does not provide much help. Cummings, Riddell, and Tibbitts (1994) conducted a large international review and reported that efficiency arguments have been put forward for both decentralization and centralization. They stress the importance of distinguishing between the macroeconomic and the microeconomic levels in relation to the requirements of efficiency.

Decentralization of Financial Responsibility.

The evidence indicates that financing implications are highly country specific at the macroeconomic level in efforts to reduce the central governments' education costs through decentralization. The thirteen-year decentralization process in Mexico shifted the financial responsibility for primary and secondary education even further to the central government, but Argentina succeeded in shifting responsibility for financing public primary education from the central government to the provinces (Prawda 1993). There is little argument that the primary responsibility for paying teachers in public primary and junior secondary schools should rest with governments. Yet, as Mark Bray has pointed out, community and parental contribution to the costs of this level of schooling has increased in several countries. How much of this increase supports teachers salaries or the costs of teacher management is not quantified in the literature. In El Salvador communities hired and paid teachers during the war, and in Mali there are many locally hired teachers, whose salaries are paid by parents (see box 3).

Broadly speaking decentralization in Chile proceeded according to the administrative model described in chapter two. Decentralization took place in two phases. The first was in the 1980s and the second is

ongoing. Decentralization was mainly to the municipal level, although funding, including money for teacher salaries, continued to come from budget transfers. Espinola (1995) reported that the first year of decentralization (1979) required an increase of 120 percent in the budgets of municipalities. Municipal spending on salaries doubled between 1979 and 1989. During this period, private schools reduced teacher salaries, but municipal schools looked at the central government to meet their deficits. Prawda (1993) reported that municipal teachers' salaries decreased by 7 percent annually in the 1980s, while privately subsidized primary school teachers' salaries fell by 10 percent. Private schools had the flexibility to drop salaries, but under decentralization, municipal schools were allowed no flexibility in staffing. Responsibility for staffing, without control over resources, does not provide much autonomy and may hinder cost efficiency.

Reducing spending on salaries is, however, a double-edged sword. While it may bring short-term gains to those with financial responsibility, it will almost certainly have a negative impact on the ability to attract and retain qualified trained teachers. Similarly, decentralization that shifts financial responsibility to more localized units can threaten equity and access. Central authorities have responsibilities in these areas that should not be shed.

Cost-Effectiveness

Efficiency concerns go beyond questions of fiscal share and total cost to the use made and value gained from funds (cost effectiveness). Prawda (1993) reported that in the 1980s Chilean teachers in newly created, privately subsidized schools were pressured by proprietors to increase enrollment through door-to-door marketing and through automatic promotions to increase student numbers, which determined the amount of monthly subsidies from the government. Primary completion rates in these schools increased, but the cognitive achievement of students did not improve. Disparities between the highest and lowest school scores in Spanish in 1982⁸⁸ increased 34 percent. The highest scores were in high-income private schools, while the lowest were in rural municipal schools. Those new schools offered low salaries and Prawda suggests that the quality of teachers applying to them may have decreased as a result. According to Espinola (1995), there was little improvement in school performance indicators such as achievement and the repetition and dropout rates, but no measures were taken to modify school practices.

Prawda (1993) comments on the difficulty of obtaining historically reliable data on cognitive achievement during decentralization. Chile provides some information from national tests in Spanish and mathematics implemented in 1982 and 1988. There was a national decline of 14 percent in Spanish and 6 percent in mathematics. In addition, the gap between the highest scores obtained in privately paid schools and the lowest scores in the municipal schools widened. From this it is clear that the quality of education did not improve during this period, and inequity actually increased.

Inefficiencies

Like Chile, Mexico adopted the administrative decentralization model. Prawda (1993) highlighted the inefficiency costs involved in the Mexican system of ghost teachers (created when the payroll is inflated with nonexistent teachers). The number of ghost teachers in Mexico was conservatively estimated at 50,000 (or 7.8 percent of the total). The annual cost to the federal government was at least US\$112 million but possibly twice as much. Other countries, such as Zimbabwe, experienced similar problems. Such practices, which lead to cost inefficiencies, will be a temptation unless the level that has responsibility for resources such as teacher salaries is closer to the schools and is directly affected by the cost of teachers on the payroll.

Savings

Motivated at least in part by a desire to cut state government costs, Victoria State, Australia, engaged in a radical decentralization to the school or grassroots level. The state believed that real efficiency could come only from competition, which would lead to falling costs. It was believed that efficiency would increase with greater accountability so every school became self managing. Schools were given responsibility for their budget, including teacher salaries. The state government, from taxpayers' money, funds schools based on the number of students enrolled. Otherwise, schools are free to raise their own funds or to seek private sponsorship. The government hoped to cut more than \$300 million (Australian) from the education budget. Redundancy packages were offered to 8,000 teachers, and 300 schools were closed. It is too soon to assess whether the expected savings and efficiencies have been

realized, but there have been problems. Because of workload increases and threats to their job security, teachers sought a federal award. The government opposed the teachers unsuccessfully in the high court. According to the Australian Education Union, an interim award for teachers is now in place.

Wylie (1995) reported that the savings anticipated in New Zealand have not yet materialized for schools under decentralization. A 1993 study by Mitchell included a comprehensive review of literature on the implementation of decentralization in New Zealand plus longitudinal case studies of fifteen different categories of schools and a national sample of forty-eight secondary schools. Many of those Mitchell spoke to believed that the extra administrative burden that accompanied decentralization was detracting from classroom time and learning. Mitchell suggests, however, that it is too soon to judge and that the new teacher appraisal systems and staff development activities may lead to improved teaching and learning. Decentralization in industrial countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, has led to more pressure on teachers to undertake nonteaching duties; the cost-effectiveness of their doing so needs to be investigated.

The North East Basic Education Project was implemented, with support from the World Bank, between 1981 and 1987 in nine states in the northeast region of Brazil. The project was rigorously evaluated using longitudinal data collected over seven years. The published evaluation, which includes a cost-benefit, is comprehensive quantitative assessments of educational performance under a decentralization reform program (Harbison and Hanushek 1992). Unfortunately, there were many complications related to data on teachers and their management and uncertainties. But despite mixed evidence the study concluded that investment in in-service teacher training was cost-effective and produced substantial efficiency savings. Overall, the evidence was unequivocal on the importance of good teachers to student achievement.

The study offered some interesting findings on teacher salaries. Salary levels were found to be related to student achievement, but salary increases were not found to be particularly cost-effective, especially when compared with other quality-enhancing inputs. Furthermore, the study found that current salary policies discriminated among teachers on the basis of unproductive criteria. Teacher subject matter knowledge was found to be important in determining student achievement but it was not rewarded. There was a high proportion of poorly prepared teachers in the project, possibly because of the low level of pay in the project areas. There was no information on whether more highly qualified teachers might be available if salaries were higher.

Relative Efficiency of the Functioning of Teacher Management

In Mexico the World Bank has supported the Primary Education Project (PARE) since 1991. The project covers 5,000 primary schools, chiefly in four southern states with the poorest educational indicators. The evaluation component that was included in PARE shows that the program has led to improved efficiency and education quality (World Bank 1995b). Since 1990 completion rates have risen, repetitions and dropouts have fallen, and progression rates to secondary school have increased. These improvements are better than the national average. There have also been significant improvements in educational achievement at the sixth-grade level as measured by the Spanish, math and civic education tests of 1990 and 1994, although overall achievement at this level is still low. Teacher payment is linked to attendance.

About two years into the program a study found that teacher attendance had improved by 60 percent. Attendance continues to be checked and closely monitored. A 1994 study found that supervision incentives were the most cost-effective educational inputs in PARE for both rural and indigenous schools. The most effective combination of inputs for mathematics in rural schools was teacher in-service training, supervision incentives, and the provision of educational materials. The results of the PARE evaluation are being used to identify future investment priorities for primary education in the country as a whole. The national effort may yield useful information about expanding innovative subnational programs.

A Lack of Evidence on Impact

There is little evidence on the effects of decentralized teacher management. Few attempts have been made to establish indicators on teacher performance. There is also little objective information on teacher performance prior to decentralization against which to measure any changes in performance. What data are available focus on the implementation of decentralization; there is little analysis of learning outcomes. It is difficult to distinguish the impact of decentralization from the effects of other changes, such as alterations of the curriculum and developments in society and the economy. There has also been little effort made to separate teacher management functions from other decentralized education functions. What is needed are systematic and

objective evaluations of the impact of decentralized teacher management on the teaching-learning process and its outcomes.

This issue of assessment has not been tackled adequately in either industrial or developing countries. We need more impact evaluation studies of the kind undertaken by PARE in Mexico. PARE's study looked at issues such as efficiency, educational achievement, overall effectiveness, and cost effectiveness.

While there is little quantitative data on the effects of decentralization, there is some qualitative information on how decentralization has affected the accountability of teachers to parents and the local community. Social assessments in the Minas Gerais project in Brazil and in the EDUCO project in El Salvador indicate that teachers in these programs meet more often with parents and are regarded more highly by parents than nonprogram teachers; their attendance is also better. In Nigeria parents report that teachers have shown up to class on time since the introduction of local supervision (Gaynor 1995).

Outcomes can of course be properly evaluated only in light of the social context in which the decentralization takes place. It is not appropriate to identify best practices without taking into account the social context in which the projects were carried out. There is not enough empirical evidence on the effects of decentralizing teacher management to make the identification of best practices possible. Thus effective monitoring and evaluation are essential for understanding the successes and failures of decentralization.

4

Conclusions and Recommendations.

A case for or against the decentralization of teacher management has not yet been made; the evidence that we have so far is simply too sparse. There has been little full-scale decentralization of teacher management to the school level in public education in developing countries. There are examples of smaller initiatives in countries such as El Salvador, Mexico, and Nepal, but one has to look to industrial countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand to find examples on a national scale. Decentralization is, however, far from a uniform trend in industrial countries, since many countries, such as France, do not allow local control over teachers, and other countries, such as Ireland, do so only in the context of strong central rules and regulations. The limitation in our knowledge of decentralization was highlighted in the 1995 review of World Bank lending for education decentralization (Chakraborty 1995). Despite these caveats, lessons can be learned and conclusions drawn from our review of international experience.

Conclusions

It must be remembered that the decentralization of teacher management is not a substitute for a well-designed and well-functioning education system. Alone, decentralization cannot be expected to have a direct effect on learning outcomes, although it may have a profound impact on the working conditions of teachers. It cannot solve deeprooted problems. In fact, the decentralization of teacher management appears to work most effectively when it is part of an education system that is already functioning well.

Which Functions to Decentralize

No country has completely decentralized teacher management. The main issue is determining which functions are performed better under

centralized control and which are carried out better if decentralized. The evidence suggests that in-service training and pedagogical supervision can be decentralized and that teachers unions can play a role in making this possible. The evidence also shows that schools and communities can hire teachers directly. The central authorities should set the relevant standards for teacher qualifications, and teachers can be hired at lower levels of the system in accordance with these standards.

Learning Outcomes

We seem to know least about the most important issue, that is, the effect of decentralizing teacher management on learning outcomes. It is too soon to determine the learning outcomes in many countries, but even the initial effects of decentralization on learning are given scant attention in the literature. There is a paucity of outcome evaluations and a lack of systematic reporting on outcomes. The evidence that is available is mainly impressionistic. According to a 1993 study, most trustees, principals, and teachers in New Zealand thought that decentralization had had a minimal effect on children's learning. Some teachers suggested that the extra time they had to spend on the management and administration function had a negative impact, because it reduced the amount of time and attention given to classroom learning (Mitchell and others 1993). Other evidence from innovative teacher management programs is more positive. For example, test results suggest that educational achievement improved significantly over the life of the PARE project in Mexico (1990-1994). And the Minas Gerais project in Brazil reported gains in student examination results between 1992 and 1994 during decentralization. It is possible that the initial level of achievement among students has a bearing on learning outcomes and that the lower the initial level, the more scope there is for improvement.

Teaching Quality

The evidence is scant on the impact of decentralization on teaching quality. An impact evaluation study of the PARE project in Mexico concluded that supervision incentives were the most cost-effective educational input for both rural and indigenous schools. Teacher in-service training was also found to be a cost-effective input. What additional evidence is available suggests that local teacher appraisal systems and

incentive schemes, and an increased emphasis on local staff development activities increase the likelihood that teaching and learning will improve. It would be interesting to carry out an empirical study on the influence of teacher quality on student performance, as the gap between perception and reality may be wide and the possibility of bias, unwitting or otherwise, clearly exists. Half of the primary teachers interviewed in a 1993 survey in New Zealand said that educational changes negatively affected their job satisfaction. Smaller schools in New Zealand and Australia reported difficulties under decentralization in meeting their needs for specialist teachers. The fact that small schools are required to hire their own teachers within a limited quota of staff positions often results in the school's inability to hire specialist teachers.

Experiences such as those of Australia and New Zealand show the dangers of allowing market forces alone to determine teacher supply. In many countries there are staffing crises in disadvantaged areas, such as remote rural communities and inner cities. Children of ethnic, indigenous, or immigrant minorities often live in such areas and face additional disadvantages because of language and culture difference and discrimination. Additional staffing is needed to meet the needs of such children, but the reality is often understaffing.

There is some evidence that setting salaries at the school level may have detrimental effects on teacher quality. Teachers in the United Kingdom feared that the school-level hiring of teachers from block grants would lead to the employment of cheaper teachers. Their fears appear to have been realized. A University of Birmingham study found that the share of temporary and part-time contracts in national teacher employment figures increased. In Australia the teachers union reports that there is creeping casualization in the teaching service. In Sweden some local control over setting salaries has been introduced, but checks and balances have been included in the system. This kind of safeguard may be necessary, although we do not yet know enough about the decentralization of salary determination. There is, however, evidence from several countries that neither the general public nor the schools want to take on responsibility of setting salaries (see table 1 on page 19).

Accountability

One argument often used in favor of decentralizing teacher management functions is that it will ensure teacher accountability and professionalism. It is argued that bureaucrats are unwilling or unable to take action against teachers who do not fulfill their professional responsi-

bilities. Locally determined incentives seem to improve performance, at least in areas in which teacher salaries are low. Sanctions may also have a positive effect. In Nepal a threat from the Ministry of Education to withdraw grants from schools that performed poorly for more than three years in a row caused teachers to work harder for fear of losing their jobs. Evidence from El Salvador, Mexico, Nepal, and Pakistan suggests that increases in school autonomy can lead to better teacher attendance and motivation. The initiatives in these countries are, however, small and it is not clear whether their benefits could be repeated or sustained if the programs were replicated on a national scale.

An alternative way to increase teacher accountability is to devolve responsibility for monitoring teacher performance to professional teacher bodies. This approach has been introduced in the United States and is being considered in Uganda and elsewhere. Experience from Scotland, where the practice has been followed for some time, and from other professions shows that monitoring by professional bodies can be an effective way to increase professional accountability. Measures to increase teacher accountability cannot succeed, however, if they are introduced in systems that do not provide enough income to allow teachers to concentrate on one teaching job or that neglect supervision, in-service training, and support services.

Efficiency and Effectiveness.

It is reasonable to assume that if decentralization does not increase operational efficiency, it is unlikely to have a positive effect on teacher morale or motivation or on the quality of instruction. There is some evidence that decentralizing teacher management functions does not automatically increase operational efficiency. Decentralizing responsibility for teacher management to lower administrative levels will not be effective if the level receiving the responsibility cannot support it. In several countries in Latin America (for example, Colombia and Mexico) and in Africa (for example, Nigeria and Zimbabwe), there have been policy swings back to centralization after it became clear that there was inefficiency in handling teacher management at the levels to which it was devolved. It is difficult to find examples in the literature of countries in which the decentralization of teacher management has increased efficiency, although we know that Mexico has ensured the timely payment of teacher salaries under decentralization and that the Minas Gerais project in Brazil has improved teacher training. The chief gains in New Zealand appear to include greater efficiency and decisionmaking and the increased flexibility and respon-

siveness of the system, although it is not possible, from the literature available, to separate the impact of decentralizing teacher management functions from the impact of other changes in the education sector.

Cost Sharing

Sharing the financial responsibility for teachers between the government and the community seems to be workable, especially if there is a strong demand for education and an inability on the part of government to compensate teachers. But the involvement of parents or community in meeting the salary costs of teachers has implications for equity, especially if qualified teachers are a scarce resource. In privatized or market systems, wealthier communities can raise more money to pay teachers and can thus attract better teachers. The United Kingdom, where teacher salaries are not centrally determined, has equity problems of this kind. In Zimbabwe private trust schools that charge high fees and more affluent government schools are able to hire more teachers, pay higher salaries, and provide better conditions than less affluent schools. It is not surprising that the more affluent schools attract the most qualified and experienced teachers. In Brazil schools in prosperous states pay teachers double the salaries that are paid elsewhere. The employment of unqualified teachers is more common in the poor northeast than elsewhere and more common in rural areas than in urban areas. The ethics of having parents pay teacher salaries in poor rural areas while the government pay teacher salaries in public, mainly urban, schools is questionable.

Equity considerations also arise in the treatment of teachers. The growth in part-time and temporary teacher contracts that has accompanied the school-level setting of salaries in the United Kingdom and certain states in Australia is a cause for concern. It can be argued that the government is responsible for seeing that equity in education extends to ensuring that the work of teachers throughout the country is equally remunerated. On equity grounds, there is an argument for retaining central government responsibility for both the distribution and the payment of teachers.

Preconditions for Effective Implementation

The evidence available so far shows that several preconditions need to be met for teacher management to be effectively decentralized.

Capacity and resources. An important precondition for decentralizing teacher management and other functions in education is the availability of sufficient capacity and resources at the level to which responsibilities are transferred. Even in countries with enough resources, there are capacity and workload implications when the responsibility for staffing is devolved to the school level. Several small schools in Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are encountering difficulties with the distribution of resources. There have been complaints from some teacher bodies in the United Kingdom and Australia that resources are being transferred by school authorities away from teaching and learning and toward marketing the school to parents of potential pupils. Adequate support must be given to the level to which the function has been devolved. In the Minas Gerias project in Brazil the state gave computer systems to the schools to enable them to manage their teachers efficiently at the school level.

The literature has many examples of mismanagement by local authorities who were given responsibility for managing teachers but inadequate resources. Nigeria, Colombia, and Zimbabwe have had such problems. In some innovative programs, such as the Basic Education Expansion Project in Mali and the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee program in Bangladesh, nongovernmental organizations play an important role in building capacity and providing resources. Bilateral agencies such as the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency and United States Agency for International Development and multilateral donors such as the World Bank also help to provide resources to innovative programs. The Shiksha Karmi program in India and the EDUCO project in El Salvador have received such support. The sustainability of these programs has not yet been tested.

Cooperation of teachers. The success of any decentralization of teacher management depends crucially on the cooperation of the teachers themselves. How receptive teachers are to changes in the way they are managed depends on their pay. If salaries are low, or at least regarded by teachers as low, then teachers are not likely to be enthusiastic about being managed locally. At a minimum decentralization should not threaten teachers' jobs, promotion prospects, workload, or conditions of service. When teacher management was decentralized in New Zealand, the national collective contracts for teachers remained in place, which was a key reason that schools and teachers accepted the reforms and helped to implement them. Better still, reforms should include clear benefits and incentives for teachers, such as the salary increases of 22 to 100 percent that were agreed to in Nicaragua. In some

countries, budget constraints will preclude financial benefits to teachers, but there are other less costly benefits and incentives that can be included in the reforms. In Mauritius, for example, more posts (deputy heads) were created, generating additional opportunities for promotion, and more opportunities were made available for staff to receive in-service training, which opened the way for teachers to raise their salaries by increasing their qualifications (Selwyn 1995).

Leadership. Strong, effective leadership, especially at the national level, is necessary to create the momentum to pass and implement decentralization reforms. This leadership needs to be provided by an individual or body that has credibility with teachers, the education community, and society. The leader must have a consultative style and strong political support. Ideally, the leader should be an influential education minister with long tenure and the motivation to oversee the implementation of decentralization reforms, Mauritius has such a leader, while the New Zealand government appointed a chief executive to fill this role.

Core educational values. The extent to which the decentralization effort supports core educational values is important. Considerable resistance can be anticipated from stakeholders, especially teachers unions, where decentralization initiative is part of a major change, such as the shift toward privatization in education that took place in the United Kingdom and Australia. If the unions suspect government's motive and regard the decentralization of responsibility for teachers as a way of passing the buck from the central government to the schools and communities, there is bound to be controversy. There is some evidence that communities, as well as teachers, are suspicious of the motives of government (for example, in Nigeria and Zimbabwe). Pursuing a consultative and inclusive style, like that adopted in Sweden and Mauritius, can help to allay such fears if they are groundless. What seems to make a difference is the presence of a shared vision among stakeholders, stakeholders' commitment to the principles behind the reform, and flexibility among those designing the reform.

Political Considerations

The political climate and the extent to which stakeholders are open to change are important factors in determining the effective implementation of decentralization, as has been shown in the decentralization attempts in Chile and Australia. The needs of the different stakeholders must be con-

sidered, and the greater the effort to involve stakeholders, the more effective the process will be, as shown by the experience of New Zealand. It also helps if the principles that underlie the reforms are supported by society and by those in the education sector. In the United Kingdom, the decentralization reforms were promoted by government, and there is little evidence to suggest that parents wanted the reform; some evidence even suggests that they did not (Wikeley and Hughes 1995; Kogan 1993).

Policy Recommendations

The following recommendations refer to measures that can be taken by governments or donors in consultation with stakeholders, such as education unions. It is not possible to assign priorities to these measures, because each country must devise a strategy that suits its own needs. The recommendations are grouped under three headings: overall strategy, capacity building, and governance.

Overall Strategy

Developing an effective teacher management system calls for a comprehensive, integrated, and long-term strategy that is aligned to an overall approach to education and schooling. The goal of managing teachers should be to improve the management of schools; the realities and needs of individual schools must therefore be taken into account. The overall policy framework must be comprehensive, clear, and effectively communicated, because it is important to build strong support in the community for any proposed changes. The changes should be discussed with all the different stakeholders. There is a much better chance of gaining stakeholders' support if the proposals are built on a clear strategic base, as they were in New Zealand and Sweden. The government should designate a body to supervise and facilitate the discussion of the proposed changes among teachers and other stakeholders. Teachers are usually concerned about who is initiating the reforms, whether the reform proposals are coming from bodies outside the education sector, and whether teachers or their organizations have been involved in designing the reforms (Education International 1996). These concerns can be allayed if there are clear, open, and accessible lines of communication during the consultation process. The process must make sense to teachers, school managers, and parents. Planning, sequencing, and coor-

dinating the decentralization of teacher management with the decentralization of other elements in the system is also important.

Capacity Building.

Strong institutional capacity is required if decentralization is to succeed. Those responsible for teacher management must have the skills, resources, and authority to bear the responsibility for personnel management and staff development. Before proceeding with the decentralization it may be necessary to build the capacity of the administrative level to which teacher management functions are to be devolved. Specific functions should be devolved to the most appropriate level that is to the level that can carry out the responsibilities or that can develop the ability to do so over time. The assessment of existing capacity should consider both human and technical capabilities, which may be available in the administrative level receiving authority, the local community, or the private sector. In some countries the capabilities of NGOs and government have been combined in innovative ways to, for example, provide in-service teacher training. Initially, communities and local authorities will need guidance and support to develop procedures for recruiting, monitoring, and supervising.

There are workload implications for the authorities who take on responsibility for teacher management. Workload issues must be recognized, and those who take on responsibility should be given the necessary incentives and encouragement to carry out their duties effectively. The devolution of responsibility for teacher management cannot be perceived as an off-loading of responsibility from the central government. The government must demonstrate its support for the devolution by, for example, committing itself to supplementing teacher salaries to support school-level recruitment. Other ways in which the central government can support local authorities to help them overcome inevitable problems of scale include facilitating recruitment drives and advertising vacancies and promotional posts.

Head teachers and supervisors must be trained in pedagogical supervision. The role of the head is crucial in school-level teacher management, including staff development. Heads should be trained to understand the development needs of teachers and involve teachers in meeting these needs. External supervision should be local and should take into account school needs, plans, objectives, and strategies. Consideration should be given to reorienting the activities of the inspectorate so that it can provide pedagogical support.

Governance

It may be necessary to retain central legislative or normative control over some functions of teacher management, even after decentralization has gone into effect. For example, the equitable distribution of resources, of which teachers are the most important, is fundamental to the effective management of the educational process. It is essential to work toward eliminating, or at least minimizing, inequities in the national distribution of qualified teachers. Control over teacher qualifications, standards, and distribution should therefore be exercised at the national level, using mechanisms such as teacher incentive schemes, accelerated promotion, and special study leave. Local discretion should, however, be allowed in implementing these initiatives.

Choices about the most appropriate level to which to devolve teacher management functions depend on the capacities of different levels of the system. As this review has shown, few countries have devolved responsibility for teacher management completely to schools on a national scale, signifying that schools rarely have the capacity or desire to deal with devolved functions, that there are many stakeholders and interests to consider, and that different contexts require different solutions. If the responsibility for teacher management is to be given to regional or district administrative levels, it is important to have a rationale for doing so based on the value added to teaching and learning, to ensure that there is agreement on the specific functions for which the region or district will be responsible, and to describe the devolved responsibilities.

It is important to ensure compatibility between the rights and needs of teachers and the autonomy of the level to which authority is devolved. From the outset, the central government must ensure that all parties understand the extent and limits of their powers. To minimize the likelihood of abuse of power, there must be safeguards and mechanisms that balance the rights and needs of teachers and the autonomy and needs of schools. If political considerations outweigh the needs of teachers or schools, the chances of building an effective and sustainable teacher management system are limited. There should be no inconsistencies in the designation of duties among different levels. It is also important to ensure that the general legal framework does not conflict with the organization of teacher management, as happened in Colombia.

Never underestimate the importance of the process of setting pay levels. Salary determination is one of the most sensitive aspects of teacher management. The people most affected (classroom teachers)

must be involved. Education unions, administrators, school boards, parents, and political leaders also need to be involved. The evidence suggests that the salary parameters are best set at the regional or national level. Schools and school boards may be reluctant to become involved in pay negotiations, and they may be ill prepared for such involvement. If they are to play a role, there should be clear national guidelines to support their efforts and to guard against the risk that inequalities will be increased.

It is important to include teacher incentive schemes in the reform, because teachers must be able to perceive benefits to themselves in the proposed changes. Any compensation for the decentralization of teacher management should be structured to reinforce the broader education reforms. School organization, incentives, and teacher compensation should be closely linked. Skill-based pay and individual or collective performance awards should replace outdated incentive schemes based on seniority. Teachers who take on additional duties, such as management, should receive allowances and appropriate titles.

Teachers organizations should be involved in professional issues, including the development of professional licensing standards for teachers. Teachers and their representative organizations in several countries (for example, Australia, Ireland, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe) are involved in setting standards for the profession. While the central government should retain some licensing responsibility, decentralization should give teachers more say in defining and upholding standards for the profession. Teachers could establish detailed codes of conduct, regulate entry to the profession, and be held responsible by their colleagues for ethical practice. Such professional accountability would enhance the accountability of teachers to parents and the education ministry and would help to raise the status of teachers.

Education unions should be recognized as social partners because they can bring to the reform process firsthand knowledge of education in the schools and classrooms. Collective bargaining and other forms of negotiation and consultation can support the development and implementation of effective reforms and the improvement of educational quality.

Time should be spent in devising an effective teacher appointment system at the local level. The amount of central control and guidance that schools and local administrators will need has yet to be determined. For example, what level of central or regional control over entry qualifications and standards is required? What procedures should be followed in recruiting teachers? How should a system for resolving grievances be organized? How can flexibility and equity in the distribution and appointment of teachers be ensured?

In some countries teacher management is part of a broader system that manages civil and public servants and is subject to a set of regulations administered by a public service commission. These countries may want to consider a teacher service commission. In countries in which teachers account for a significant proportion of the civil service (for example, 42 percent of government employees in Ghana are teachers), a separate structure may be economically justifiable. In other countries questions of cost may rule out this option. Evidence from studies undertaken on the feasibility of this option suggests that, to be accepted and effective, a teacher service commission must:

Involve all stakeholders, including parents, teachers, and officials.

Be relatively simple in structure and flexible to changing needs.

Have the authority to make decisions within broad legislative and public service guidelines.

Have a clear management and support structure.

Have transparent and consistent procedures and communication channels.

Be adequately staffed and have enough resources.

Be decentralized to the regional or district level.

Research Priorities

More research is needed on the impact of the decentralization of teacher management on classroom behavior. Further efforts are also needed to increase our understanding of the dynamics of teacher management and the characteristics of an optimal system. This research should be done at the levels of the classroom, the community, and the education system.

Pedagogical research must be strengthened to improve the quality of education. For example, in-service and action research should be carried out, and the research results should be communicated to teachers in an effective manner. Schools must be allowed to have a direct input into the research process by, for example, becoming involved in research design and implementation.

More systematic monitoring and evaluation of the process, impact, and outcome of decentralization is required. The design and establishment of structures and the delivery of inputs, such as performance incentives, must be tracked and improvements must be measured in student learning. Social assessments (like those carried out for the Minas Gerais project in Brazil and the EDUCO project in El Salvador) can illuminate what is happening at the community level. A baseline

measure of the situation before decentralization is needed so that progress can be assessed.

More gender-disaggregated information about the different effects of decentralization on men and women teachers is called for. This need should be taken into account in monitoring and reporting and in impact and evaluation studies.

Local innovations and pilot projects in teacher management need to be supported, and the lessons extracted from such efforts should be widely disseminated. Caution is called for in applying lessons from the innovative but small-scale projects we have discussed in this report to national programs. More research is needed on the potential of those small programs to be replicated and scaled up.

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